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The difficulty of saying when the power to lay uniform taxes is 
curtailed, because its use brings a result beyond the direct legisla-
tive power of Congress, has given rise to diverse decisions. In 
that area of abstract ideas, a final definition of the line between 
state and federal power has baffled judges and legislators.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
HE Commerce Clause empowers Congress to use penalties to 
regulate interstate commerce, whereas the Taxing Clause em-
powers Congress to tax commercial and non-commercial conduct. 
These clauses do not authorize Congress to penalize non-
commercial conduct. What prevents Congress from penalizing non-
commercial conduct by changing the label on an exaction from 
“penalty” to “tax”? The only obstacle is the constitutional distinc-
tion between a tax and a penalty. Thus a Court that seeks to im-
pose even modest limits on the regulatory power of Congress un-
der the Commerce Clause requires a jurisprudence that 
distinguishes between a tax and a penalty. 
T 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been inadequate to 
the task. “[D]iverse decisions” in this “area of abstract ideas,” the 
Court once noted, show that the difference between a tax and a 
penalty “has baffled judges and legislators.”2 When the Court re-
stricted federal commerce power in the 1920s and 1930s,3 it distin-
guished between taxes, which raise revenues, and penalties, which 
regulate behavior.4 This distinction is perplexing because many 
federal exactions do both, like the eighteenth century “imposts” 
that raised revenues from imports and suppressed foreign competi-
tion with American industry.5 The post-1937 Court essentially 
abandoned judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause, 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) (invalidating the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 because federal regulation of wages and 
hours concerned production, not commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 545–46 (1935) (invalidating the Live Poultry Code for 
New York City, which regulated the sale of sick chickens and which included wages, 
hours, and child-labor provisions, based on an “indirect” relationship to interstate 
commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895) (holding that 
the Sherman Antitrust Act could not be used to thwart a monopoly in the sugar refin-
ing industry because the commerce power did not authorize Congress to regulate 
manufacturing, which was antecedent to commerce). 
4 See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922). 
5 For numerous instances in addition to the impost, see infra Part I; see generally 
Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 984 (2011) (of-
fering many examples to substantiate the consensus among tax scholars that “the 
[federal] government uses the tax law not only to raise revenue, but also to influence 
taxpayer behavior”); id. at 989 (“Congress undeniably uses taxation to raise the costs 
of activities it deems undesirable.”). 
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so it had no need to rethink distinctions between taxes and penal-
ties. In 1995, however, the Supreme Court began to restrict the 
power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause.6 After 
its “new federalism” decisions, the Court did not reconsider the 
scope of the tax power until the minimum coverage provision in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act7 required most in-
dividuals to either buy health insurance or make a payment to the 
Internal Revenue Service. Writing for the Court in National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”),8 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts concluded that this requirement is a tax for constitu-
tional purposes, even though Congress called it a “penalty.”9 
The logic, citations, and rhetoric of the Chief Justice’s tax-power 
analysis closely resemble this Article, which we developed for two 
years prior in conferences and online posting of earlier drafts.10 Is 
the connection between this Article and the Court’s decision coin-
cidental or causal? This question is not our concern here.11 A schol-
6 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995); see also United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
7 Public L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
8 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
9 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (Supp. 2011). 
10 An earlier version of this Article was first posted on SSRN on January 23, 2012, 
and revised in May 2012. 
11 We and others have discussed this question elsewhere. Siegel discussed this Arti-
cle on the blog Balkinization both before and after the Supreme Court decided NFIB. 
Neil Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, Balkini-
zation, June 28, 2012, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/not-power-to-destroy-
effects-theory-of.html; Neil Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: A Theory of the Tax 
Power that Justifies the Minimum Coverage Provision, Balkinization, Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/03/not-power-to-destroy-theory-of-tax.html. After the 
Court decided the case on June 28, 2012, Jeff Rosen provided a link to this Article in 
writing online at The New Republic that “[a]rguments by liberal scholars who care 
about constitutional text and history, such as Neil Siegel of Duke Law School, were 
reflected in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion about the taxing power.” Jeffrey Rosen, 
Welcome to the Roberts Court: How the Chief Justice Used Obamacare to Reveal 
His True Identity, The New Republic, June 29, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/
blog/plank/104493/welcome-the-roberts-court-who-the-chief-justice-was-all-along. 
Randy Barnett wrote on the Volokh Conspiracy blog that “it looks like Neil Siegel 
and Bob Cooter anticipated Chief Justice Roberts[’] approach in their paper, Not the 
Power to Destroy . . . and may even have provided him with the road map for his 
analysis.” Randy Barnett, The Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice Roberts’ 
Opinion, The Volokh Conspiracy, July 5, 2012, http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/05/the-
unprecedented-uniqueness-of-chief-justice-roberts-opinion/. We posted on SCOTUS-
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arly paper is an opportunity to develop a general theory uncon-
strained by the need to decide a particular case. This Article aims 
to develop an effects theory of the tax power in order to distinguish 
a tax from a penalty for purposes of Article I, Section 8. The effects 
theory, we believe, provides the best justification of Roberts’s tax-
power analysis in NFIB. 
To sharpen the difference in the meaning of the key words, the 
effects theory distinguishes between pure penalties and pure taxes. 
A pure penalty condemns the actor for wrongdoing. Moreover, she 
must pay more than the usual gain from the forbidden conduct, 
and she must pay at an increasing rate with intentional or repeated 
violations. Condemnation coerces expressively through forms of 
speech, and relatively high rates with enhancements coerce materi-
ally by imposing economic costs. A pure penalty prevents behavior, 
thereby raising little revenue. 
Alternatively, a pure tax permits a person to engage in the taxed 
conduct. Moreover, she must pay an exaction that is less than the 
usual gain from the taxed conduct, and intentional or repeated 
conduct does not enhance the rate. Permission does not coerce ex-
pressively and relatively low rates without enhancements do not 
coerce materially. A pure tax dampens conduct but does not pre-
vent it, thereby raising revenues. 
Situated between pure taxes and pure penalties are mixed exac-
tions, whose expression sounds like a penalty and whose material 
characteristics look like a tax. Thus the exaction for noninsurance 
in the minimum coverage provision has a penalty’s expression and 
a tax’s materiality. The rate of the “penalty” is low enough that a 
significant number of people will pay it, and the rate does not in-
crease with intent or recidivism. Should courts interpret a mixed 
blog an account of the similarities in logic, citations, and rhetoric between this Article 
and the Court’s decision. Neil Siegel and Robert Cooter, Online ACA Symposium: A 
Theory of the Tax Power that Justifies—and May Have Informed—the Chief Justice’s 
Analysis, SCOTUSblog, July 9, 2012, 12:48 PM, http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-
aca-symposium-a-theory-of-the-tax-power-that-justifies-and-may-have-informed-the-chief-
justices-analysis-2/. Brian Leiter’s blog linked approvingly to our SCOTUSblog post. 
Brian Leiter, Cooter & Siegel: The Real Originators of the Tax Power Theory for 
Upholding the ACA, Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, July 10, 2012, 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/07/cooter-siegel-the-real-originators-of-
the-tax-power-theory-for-upholding-the-aca.html. Note, however, that the Chief Jus-
tice’s opinion does not cite our paper or any scholarly article published in a law re-
view. 
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exaction as a tax or a penalty? Our answer depends on the exac-
tion’s effect. If Congress could reasonably conclude that the exac-
tion will dampen—but not prevent—the general class of conduct 
subject to it and thereby raise revenue, then courts should interpret 
it as a tax regardless of what the statute calls it. If Congress could 
reasonably conclude only that the exaction will prevent the con-
duct of almost all people subject to it and thereby raise little or no 
revenue, then courts should interpret it as a penalty. 
Our effects theory of the tax power defers to the reasonable ex-
pectations of Congress concerning the consequences of an exac-
tion.12 In the case of the minimum coverage provision, the Congres-
sional Budget Office predicts that the exaction for noninsurance 
will dampen uninsured behavior but not prevent it, thereby raising 
several billion dollars in revenue each year.13 Accordingly, the ex-
action is a tax for purposes of the tax power. These predictions rely 
primarily on the material characteristics of the exaction, not its la-
bel. In general, the material characteristics of an exaction provide 
incentives that can guide an effects test. 
This Article develops the effects theory of the tax power in 
stages.14 Part I, on history, recounts why supporters of the Constitu-
tion advocated a robust tax power and identifies the purposes of 
federal taxation throughout American history. Part II, on doctrine, 
distinguishes three eras in the Court’s struggle to differentiate a tax 
from a penalty. These parts conclude that the modern Court needs 
a distinction between taxes and regulations backed by penalties, 
12 For a discussion of judicial deference in enumerated powers cases, see infra Sec-
tion III.B. 
13 See infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text (noting the Congressional Budget 
Office’s predictions). 
14 We limit our analysis to the distinction between a tax and a penalty under Article 
I, Section 8. We do not analyze the distinction between taxes and fees under the Ex-
port Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5, nor do we analyze the distinction in the con-
stitutional context of intergovernmental tax immunity. Finally, we do not analyze the 
distinction between a tax and a penalty in various federal statutes, including the fed-
eral tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006), the Tax Injunction Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), or the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2006). These con-
stitutional and statutory settings implicate context-specific legal questions that we 
cannot attempt to address here. 
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and that this distinction cannot turn on whether an exaction raises 
revenues or regulates behavior.15 
Part III, on theory, distinguishes between a tax and a penalty by 
analyzing their expressive and material differences, and by using 
economics to predict the effect of these differences. Part IV, on 
health care, applies this analysis to the minimum coverage provi-
sion and shared responsibility payment in the ACA. An addendum 
to this part analyzes the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts for the 
Court in NFIB. The Conclusion summarizes the argument and 
connects it to the theory of collective action federalism.16 
I. HISTORY 
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “lay and collect 
Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States.”17 Its original justifica-
tions and historical uses show that the constitutional difference be-
tween taxes and penalties cannot turn on the difference between 
raising revenues and regulating behavior. 
A. Pre-Ratification 
The Articles of Confederation created a form of government 
that impeded the states from acting collectively for common objec-
tives.18 The structure of governance established by the Articles 
posed two obstacles to collective action. First, the Articles author-
15 The relevant distinction is between taxes and regulations backed by penalties, not 
between taxes and regulations. To regulate conduct is to lay down a rule (or standard) 
governing the conduct. Regulations change behavior by various means, especially by 
imposing obligations backed by penalties. Like regulations backed by penalties, taxes 
change behavior. When a lawmaker wants to change behavior, a regulation backed by 
a penalty sometimes does a better job than a tax, and sometimes the opposite is true. 
In these circumstances, the difference between a regulation backed by a penalty and a 
tax is not the lawmaker’s ends but the choice of means. Taxes and penalties  have dif-
ferent characteristics, which change behavior by different means. This Article ex-
plains how taxes and penalties differ in characteristics and effects. 
16 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010). 
17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
18 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of 
the Constitution 24–28, 47–48, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (discussing various failures of 
the Articles of Confederation). Almost all of the first thirty-six essays in The Federal-
ist detail the inadequacies of the Articles. 
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ized little federal power and imposed a unanimity requirement in 
order to amend them.19 Significant federal action thus required 
unanimous agreement among the states. A single “holdout” state 
legislature could defeat measures that were deemed critically im-
portant by most other states. 
A key instance of collective inaction was the repayment of the 
debts of the United States.20 During the 1780s, the United States 
needed to restore its credit by repaying its debts incurred during 
the Revolutionary War.21 Without credit, the nation would be vul-
nerable militarily because it could not borrow from other nations 
to finance future wars.22 To repay existing debts, a federal impost (a 
tax on imports) was proposed three times in Congress. “The 1781 
and 1783 proposals to give the national government the 5 percent 
impost would have limited use of the revenues collected to the 
payment of the debts of the Revolutionary War,”23 rather than cre-
ating a general federal power to tax. These modest proposals did 
not survive the unanimity requirement of the Articles. Each time a 
different state vetoed the measure.24 
Second, the Articles required Congress to ask the states to con-
trol individuals, rather than Congress’s doing so directly through 
federal law. Thus Congress could apportion taxes among the states, 
but levying and collection from individuals were left to state gov-
19 See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII. 
20 See generally Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The 
Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution 15–26 (2005) (arguing that the most pressing 
need at the time of the Constitution’s creation was to allow the federal government to 
tax in order to pay off its Revolutionary War debts). 
21 See generally W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America 16 (2d ed. 2004) 
(“Among the most pressing [practical problems] were how to finance the Revolution-
ary War debts, and how to establish the credit of the nation in a way that would win 
respect in international financial markets.”); Johnson, supra note 20, at 18. 
22 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 107 (2005) (“Without 
the ability first to borrow money from abroad when war threatened and then to pay 
back the loans on time . . . America would become a tempting target for European 
empires lusting after dominion.”); Brownlee, supra note 21, at 16–17 (“A central goal 
was to fund the foreign debts that the Confederation had inherited from the Revolu-
tionary War, and to do so in a way that would win the confidence of the international 
financial markets to which the new nation would have to turn for capital.”). 
23 Johnson, supra note 20, at 89. 
24 The 1781 impost proposals were vetoed first by Rhode Island and then by Vir-
ginia. The 1783 impost proposal was vetoed by New York. See id. at 26–28. 
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ernments.25 The Articles forced the federal government to finance 
itself by requisitioning funds from the states. The amount per state 
was set “in proportion to the value of all land within each State.”26 
State governments, however, defaulted on congressional requisi-
tions, free riding on the contributions of other states to the United 
States treasury.27 The predictable consequence was very little fed-
eral revenue.28 
For example, the “Requisition of 1786, the last before the Con-
stitution, ‘mandated’ payments by the states of $3.8 million, but 
collected only $663.”29 The requisition scheme plagued Congress’s 
efforts to pay and equip troops for the national military.30 The need 
to rely on the states denied Congress the resources it required to 
protect against external attack and internal violence, as it had ear-
lier almost caused the nation to lose the Revolutionary War.31 
In his Vices of the Political System of the United States,32 a memo-
randum he wrote while preparing for the Constitutional Conven-
tion,33 James Madison recorded various problems with the Articles 
of Confederation. These problems included the failure of states to 
comply with congressional requisitions, lack of concert despite 
common interests, lack of federal protection of the states against 
25 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII. 
26 Id. 
27 See generally Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, 
and the Origins of the Constitution 12 (1993) (describing the failure of the requisition 
scheme). 
28 See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 21, at 15 (“The Continental Congress depended on 
funds requisitioned from the states, which usually ignored calls for funds or responded 
very slowly. There was little improvement under the Articles of Confederation. States 
resisted requisitions and vetoed efforts to establish national tariffs.”). 
29 See Johnson, supra note 20, at 1. 
30 Amar, supra note 22, at 45–46 (“Experience had proved that the individual states 
could not be trusted to provide their fair share of American soldiers and the money to 
pay them . . . .”). Under the Articles, Congress could only “requisition” the states for 
their “quota[s]” of men, which was based on their white populations. To pay for the 
men and their equipment, Congress had to rely on a quota system based on wealth. 
Id. at 114. 
31 Id. at 114 (“The requisition system failed miserably and came perilously close to 
handing victory to the British in the Revolutionary War. With inadequate mecha-
nisms to enforce states’ obligations, many states held back, hoarding resources for lo-
cal defense despite more urgent need for them elsewhere on the continent.”). 
32 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in James Madi-
son: Writings 69 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter Madison, Vices Memo]. 
33 See Rakove, supra note 18, at 46. 
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internal violence, and lack of coercive power.34 Madison further de-
cried the inability to pass various necessary measures, “[which] 
may at present be defeated by the perverseness of particular States 
whose concurrence is necessary.”35 The states acted individually 
when they needed to act collectively. These collective action fail-
ures made the critical period critical. Solving them was the princi-
pal reason for calling the Constitutional Convention.36 
The problems of collective action among the states during the 
1780s “necessitated a government with many more powers than 
were possessed by Congress under the Articles—including the 
great powers to tax, to raise and support armies, and to regulate 
commerce.”37 Ameliorating these problems also “necessitated con-
ferring authority to exercise these powers by acting directly on in-
dividual citizens.”38 
The Philadelphia Convention produced, and the country ratified, 
a Constitution of collective action in Article I, Section 8.39 Clause 2 
gives Congress the power to “borrow Money on the credit of the 
United States,” which would be as essential in the next war as it 
had been in the previous one.40 Clauses 3 through 6 give Congress 
34 Madison, Vices Memo, supra note 32, at 69–73. 
35 Id. at 71. 
36 See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 21, at 16 (“The Constitution reflected the desire of 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and its other leading supporters to provide the 
new central government with far greater capacity to tax than the old national gov-
ernment had enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation. The protracted political 
crisis of the 1780s convinced Madison and Hamilton that the new representative gov-
ernment must have the fiscal power required to create a strong and meaningful na-
tion.”); Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform, 122 Yale L.J. Online 5 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506 (“A primary goal 
(indeed, perhaps the single most important and frequently expressed goal) of the 
Federalist Founders was to empower the federal government to impose taxes upon 
individuals to finance basic federal functions . . . .”). 
37 Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 619 (1999). State 
discrimination against interstate commerce was yet another major collective action 
problem facing the states during the 1780s that Congress was impotent to address. 
Madison thus decried “want of concert in matters where common interest requires it,” 
a “defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs. How much has 
the national dignity, interest, and revenue suffered from this cause?” Madison, Vices 
Memo, supra note 32, at 71. 
38 Kramer, supra note 37, at 619–20. 
39 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 16, at 144–50 (analyzing the eighteen clauses of 
Article I, Section 8). 
40 See Amar, supra note 22. 
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the power to combat various impediments to the successful opera-
tion of interstate markets.41 Clauses 7 through 16 give Congress the 
power to internalize the externalities associated with providing for 
the common defense, establishing a postal network, and securing 
intellectual property rights.42 And to solve what was probably the 
single most significant collective action failure during the critical 
period—the problem of financing the national government43—
Clause 1 empowers Congress to assess, levy, and collect taxes di-
rectly from individuals, thus bypassing the states.44 
The Constitution does not limit the tax power of Congress to the 
repayment of debts, even though repaying the Revolutionary War 
debts was the immediate problem solved by the Taxing Clause 
(also known as the General Welfare Clause).45 Instead, the Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to tax in order to “provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare.”46  
B. Post-Ratification 
Promoting the general welfare by taxes sometimes involves regu-
latory ends. Congress immediately enacted tariffs that raised reve-
41 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 16, at 149–50. 
42 Id. at 147–49. 
43 See Brownlee, supra note 21, at 16 (“The fundamental structure of the federal tax 
system, as well as that of modern tax regimes, emerged from the formative emergency 
for the American federal government—the revolutionary crisis that extended through 
the formation of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
44 “The Framers adopted a complete national government able to collect taxes from 
individuals so as to avoid military action that would amount to civil war.” Johnson, 
supra note 20, at 88. The Supreme Court has recalled this history. See, e.g., Veazie 
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869) (“The General Government, 
administered by the Congress of the Confederation, had been reduced to the verge of 
impotency by the necessity of relying for revenue upon requisitions on the States, and 
it was a leading object in the adoption of the Constitution to relieve the government, 
to be organized under it, from this necessity, and confer upon it ample power to 
provide revenue by the taxation of persons and property. And nothing is clearer, from 
the discussions in the Convention and the discussions which preceded final ratification 
by the necessary number of States, than the purpose to give this power to Congress, as 
to the taxation of everything except exports, in its fullest extent.”). 
45  Johnson, supra note 20, at 89 (“[T]he Constitution gives Congress the absolute 
power to tax.”); Rakove, supra note 18, at 180 (“But [the Framers] balked at limiting 
its revenue to that source alone. The only restriction placed on the discretion of the 
legislature was to prohibit it from laying duties on exports.”). 
46 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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nues and stimulated domestic production.47 In the first two decades 
under the new Constitution, customs generated more than ten 
times the amount of federal revenue than did internal revenue.48 In 
1792, for instance, internal revenue was $209,000 and customs pro-
duced $3,443,000.49 “And between 1789 and 1815, the tariff reve-
nues accounted for about 90 percent of total federal tax reve-
nues.”50 The Founders understood that import duties would not 
only raise revenues, but would also change the behavior of those 
subject to them. Like raising revenues, stimulating domestic pro-
duction of manufactured goods by reducing their importation was 
an important legislative purpose. 
Thus Alexander Hamilton, in his December 1791 “Report on 
Manufactures” to Congress, proposed “tariffs to protect new indus-
tries and exemptions from tariffs for raw materials needed for in-
dustrial development.”51 Hamilton defended such policies not only 
on revenue-raising grounds, but also on the regulatory ground that 
they would “encourage Americans to spend their money and en-
ergy to advance industrial technology.”52 As it turned out, Congress 
rejected most of Hamilton’s program for industrialization. But in 
March 1792, Congress enacted most of the tariff program he had 
recommended: higher tariffs on manufactured goods and lower tar-
iffs on raw materials.53 
47 Amar, supra note 22, at 94 (“The big money would likely flow—and after 1789 did 
in fact flow—from federal levies on imports . . . .”); Brownlee, supra note 21, at 21 
(“Tariffs, in fact, turned out to provide the core of federal finance.”); Rakove, supra 
note 18, at 180 (“[T]he framers believed that its revenue needs would be met through 
a program of indirect taxation centering on import duties . . . .”). 
48 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1970, at 1106 (1975), available at www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-
12.pdf. Table Y 352-357 covers 1789–1939 and distinguishes between customs and in-
ternal revenue. See Brownlee, supra note 21, at 13–14 (“[T]he tax regime that fol-
lowed the creation of the new constitutional order was based on customs duties; it 
lasted until the Civil War, making it the longest in American history.”). The Federal-
ists made only limited use of excise taxes after the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, limit-
ing them almost entirely to goods and services used by affluent Americans, such as 
levies on carriages and snuff manufacturing, and stamp duties on legal transactions. 
Id. at 23–24. 
49 U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 48. 
50 Brownlee, supra note 21, at 23. 
51 See, e.g., id. at 22. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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In the subsequent course of American history, taxes were used 
for the dual purposes of raising revenues and dampening behavior, 
as Joseph Story observed in his Commentaries.54 For example, 
Congress made a rare and temporary deviation from low tariffs in 
the antebellum period when it experimented with protectionism 
during the 1820s and 1830s. The rationale for high tariffs was not to 
raise additional revenues. The rationale, rather, was “protecting 
America’s high-wage workers and high-cost industries as they 
learned how to meet their British competition.”55 Likewise, the 
Civil War tax regime instituted by the Republican Party consisted 
principally of high tariffs, which sought to encourage “a national 
market in which wages and profits were high.”56 The federal gov-
ernment had committed itself not merely to raising revenues, but 
to protecting capitalists and workers from foreign competition. 
From the Civil War’s end in 1865 and continuing through the 
1870s, the Republican-controlled Congress maintained high excise 
taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and luxury items such as perfumes and 
cosmetics. The public supported this system of consumption taxes 
partly “because of its regulatory dimensions.”57 It amounted to “a 
stunning victory for economic protectionism and, more generally, 
for government regulation through taxation. [T]he system estab-
lished tax incentives, disincentives, and subsidies as important, 
popular, and permanent elements of the federal revenue struc-
ture.”58 
The leaders of American business “lauded the regulatory effects 
of the tariff system,” including protection from foreign competition 
and capital formation at home.59 The financial community was at-
tracted to “the way in which substantial taxes on consumption 
forced [national savings] and facilitated the repayment of the war-
time debt.”60 Labor also supported high tariffs to increase employ-
54 “[T]he taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes than reve-
nue.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 962 
(1833). 
55 Brownlee, supra note 21, at 29. 
56 Id. at 245; see id. at 5, 31. This regime also imposed excise taxes on almost all con-
sumer goods. Id. at 32. 
57 Id. at 40. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 41. 
60 Id. 
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ment in selected industries by shielding American workers from 
competition with low-wage workers in other parts of the world. 
“Labor support for the high-tariff position of the Republican Party 
had much to do with its smashing electoral victory in 1896 and its 
subsequent political successes until the Great Depression.”61 
Progressives, mindful of the effects of past taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco, sought taxes to regulate individual and corporate conduct. 
After 1900, they used the federal tax power “to regulate grain and 
cotton futures, the production of white phosphorous matches, the 
consumption of narcotics, and even the employment of child la-
bor.”62 
The tax historian W. Elliot Brownlee argues that America 
shifted to new tax regimes in response to national crises.63 In the 
eighteenth century, the constitutional crisis of the critical period 
produced the plenary federal tax power. In the nineteenth century, 
the Civil War produced high tariffs that survived the war. The 
twentieth century saw three crises—World War I, the Great De-
pression, and World War II. In each case, the federal government 
responded by using the tax power to raise revenues and regulate 
behavior. Congress thereby solved collective action problems that 
would have impeded the states from acting on their own to fight 
wars and combat depressions.64 These developments vindicated 
Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration that “[t]his provision is made 
in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs.”65 
Threats to existence make people think about their reason for 
being.66 What is the nation’s purpose? Who are we as a people? 
American fiscal crises generated divisive debates over fundamental 
61 Id. at 42. 
62 Id. at 45 n.26 (citing R. Alton Lee, A History of Regulatory Taxation (1973)). 
63 Id. at 2. 
64 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 16, at 144–150 (arguing that the principal purpose 
of the clauses of Article I, Section 8 is to authorize Congress to solve collective action 
problems involving multiple states). 
65 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
66 National leaders “faced issues that went far beyond the financial problem of meet-
ing demands to increase government spending.” Brownlee, supra note 21, at 3. These 
crises involved either the survival of the nation or the meaning of the American ethos, 
our “fundamental nature as a people.” Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitu-
tion, 37 J. Legal Educ. 167, 167 (1987). 
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national values. The winners enforced their values partly by using 
the tax power to regulate behavior, not simply to raise revenues. In 
response to World War I, the government attempted to reduce so-
cial tensions over unequal wealth by imposing progressive taxes to 
finance the war. During this period, federal tax policy discouraged 
vast accumulations of wealth by taxing excess profits and incomes, 
and by taxing large estates.67 The federal government responded to 
the Great Depression by assuming “greater responsibility to pro-
mote economic recovery through such fiscal mechanisms as cutting 
taxes, increasing expenditures, and expanding deficits.”68 The 
World War II regime defended “mass-based income taxation in 
terms of not only sacrifice for national survival but also progressive 
social justice.”69 
After World War II, the combination of inflation and progres-
sive taxation automatically increased tax revenues unless offset by 
lower tax rates. Rates were reduced piecemeal, for selected sources 
of income, by the use of credits, exemptions, and deductions. The 
tax breaks benefited favored constituents and created less public 
resistance than government subsidies because they were hidden in 
the tax code instead of being exposed in the budget. Tax breaks al-
lowed politicians to accomplish regulatory objectives—such as 
promoting homeownership through the mortgage-interest deduc-
tion70—without subjecting themselves to the greater transparency 
of federal expenditures.71 
Another prominent example of modern regulation through the 
tax code is the exemption for employer-provided health insurance. 
Beginning with the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower,72 Con-
gress promoted employer-sponsored health insurance through its 
tax power. Employees generally do not include as income and pay 
67 Brownlee, supra note 21, at 58–71. 
68 Id. at 102. 
69 Id. at 245. 
70 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(E) (2006). Professor Mason notes that the deduction for 
home mortgage interest was “[e]stimated to cost the federal government over $100 
billion in 2009.” Mason, supra note 5, at 985 (citing Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Ana-
lytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009, at 298 tbl.19-
3). 
71 Brownlee, supra note 21, at 129. 
72 For an account of the history, see Dwight D. Eisenhower: Compassionate Conser-
vative, in David Blumenthal & James A. Morone, The Heart of Power: Health and 
Politics in the Oval Office 99, 112–14 (2010). 
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taxes on the payments of their health insurance premiums by their 
employers.73 In addition, employers may deduct their premium 
payments as business expenses.74 This tax subsidy for employment-
based health insurance amounted to $242 billion in 2009.75 Most 
other kinds of employee compensation do not receive such favor-
able tax treatment.  
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush justified signifi-
cant tax cuts, including cuts for the wealthiest Americans, as en-
hancing economic productivity.76 These Presidents echoed the 
rhetoric and actions of Republicans during the 1920s, when they 
used control of the federal government to cut taxes and open loop-
holes for corporations and wealthy individuals.77 Republicans justi-
fied these reductions, exemptions, and deductions as “necessary to 
stimulate economic expansion and restore prosperity.”78 Likewise, 
Democrats have created tax loopholes for their favored constitu-
ents.79 
While the two major political parties often disagree about the 
regulatory objectives that federal tax policy should pursue, they 
agree that federal tax policy aims to accomplish regulatory objec-
tives in addition to raising revenues. Brownlee concludes a history 
of federal taxation in the United States by observing that 
“[h]istorically, the introduction of new tax regimes that enhance 
confidence in American government has required,” among other 
things, “regulation of behavior in ways that were widely regarded 
as improving the national well-being.”80 
The constitutional text and political history suggest that Con-
gress possesses ample power to alter individual behavior by using 
taxes much like it uses many regulations. Accordingly, a viable dis-
73 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006). 
74 Id. § 162(a). 
75 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
76 Brownlee, supra note 21, at 165, 220–21. 
77 Id. at 71–81. 
78 Id. at 74. 
 79 During the New Deal, for example, the Democratic Party created the extensive system of 
farm subsidies that continue despite criticism and opposition. For a discussion of the current 
politics of farm subsidies, see Jennifer Steinhauer, Farm Subsidies Become Target Amid 
Spending Cuts, N.Y Times, May 6, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/05/07/us/politics/07farm.html. 
80 Brownelee, supra note 21at 245. 
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tinction between taxes and regulations backed by penalties cannot 
turn on whether an exaction has a regulatory purpose or effect. But 
Article I, Section 8 does not use the language of taxation and regu-
lation interchangeably, which suggests that they are not entirely 
synonymous. The next Part reviews the Supreme Court’s attempts 
to distinguish them. 
II. DOCTRINE 
At various times throughout American history, the Supreme 
Court has addressed the constitutional definition of “Taxes” in the 
first clause of Article I, Section 8. Roughly speaking, the Court’s 
decisions divide into three eras. A number of these rulings are 
flawed and inconsistent with one another. Drawing from their 
strengths and disregarding their weaknesses can yield a promising 
theory of the constitutional differences between taxes and regula-
tions backed by penalties. 
A. Three Eras 
The Introduction distinguished between exactions that prevent 
behavior and exactions that both dampen it and raise revenue. Be-
fore the 1920s, the Court deferred to Congress and did not make 
such distinctions. Thus in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Court upheld 
a federal law that increased a tax on state bank notes from one 
percent to ten percent, even though the tax seemed likely to elimi-
nate the state notes, thereby raising little or no revenue.81 In 
response to the charge that the tax was “so excessive as to indicate 
a purpose on the part of Congress to destroy the franchise of the 
bank,” the Court responded in part that courts “cannot prescribe 
to the legislative departments of the government limitations upon 
the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be 
exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the 
legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its 
members are elected.”82 
Similarly, in McCrary v. United States, the Court upheld a fed-
eral law that increased the excise tax from two cents to ten cents on 
81 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). 
82 Id. at 548. 
COOTER_SIEGEL_BOOK 9/11/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] Not the Power to Destroy 1211 
 
oleomargarine that was colored yellow to make it look like butter.83 
(The tax on uncolored oleomargarine, which is white, remained 
one-quarter of a cent per pound.) The Court rejected the argument 
that the exaction was a penalty that would achieve the regulatory 
objective of preventing the production of yellow oleomargarine. 
Because “the taxing power conferred by the Constitution knows no 
limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must fol-
low, if a tax be within the lawful power, the exertion of that power 
may not be judicially restrained because of the results to arise from 
its exercise.”84 The Court was unconcerned that the exaction would 
raise negligible revenue. 
Likewise, in United States v. Doremus, the Court upheld the 
Narcotic Drug Act of 1914, which both assessed individuals who 
dealt in narcotics and regulated their sale.85 The exaction was only 
$1 per year, and Congress attached a detailed enforcement regime 
to it. Even though the exaction could not significantly change be-
havior or raise revenue, the Court wrote that “[i]f the legislation 
enacted has some reasonable relation to the [raising of revenue], it 
cannot be invalidated because of the supposed [regulatory] motives 
which induced it.”86 
The doctrine changed in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Court 
was imposing significant limits on the scope of Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court 
held that Congress may not use its commerce power to prohibit the 
shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by child la-
bor.87 Congress responded with the Child Labor Tax Law, which 
provided that individuals employing child labor 
shall pay for each taxable year, in addition to all other taxes im-
posed by law, an excise tax equivalent to 10 per centum of the 
entire net profits received or accrued for such year from the sale 
83 195 U.S. 27 (1904). 
84 Id. at 59; see id. at 56 (rejecting “the proposition that where there is a lawful 
power to impose a tax its imposition may be treated as without the power because of 
the destructive effect of the exertion of the authority”). 
85 249 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1919). 
86 Id. at 93. 
87 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
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or disposition of the product of such mine, quarry, mill, cannery, 
workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment.88 
The law further authorized a federal inspection regime, interfer-
ence with which was made subject to fine or imprisonment.89 The 
law exempted employers from liability for the exaction in cases of 
“a child employed or permitted to work under a mistake of fact as 
to the age of such child, and without intention to evade the tax.”90 
In the Child Labor Tax Case, the Justices invalidated the law.91 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft distinguished exactions 
that the Constitution authorizes under the tax power from penal-
ties, which the tax power does not authorize. He stated that taxes 
have “only that incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must 
inevitably involve[.]”92 “Taxes,” he elaborated, “are occasionally 
imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects with 
the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the 
incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continu-
ance onerous.”93 On this view, “[t]hey do not lose their character as 
taxes because of the incidental motive.”94 He insisted, however, 
that “there comes a time” when an exaction amounts to a penalty.95 
That time comes when, “in the extension of the penalizing features 
of the so-called tax . . . it loses its character as such and becomes a 
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment.”96 
88 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 35 (1922). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 37 (“[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to 
stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and 
regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. 
How can we properly shut our minds to it?”); id. at 39 (“The case before us can not be 
distinguished from that of Hammer v. Dagenhart.” (citation omitted)). 
92 Id. at 36. 
93 Id. at 38. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id; accord United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936) (“A tax, in the general 
understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for 
the support of the Government. The word has never been thought to connote the ex-
propriation of money from one group for the benefit of another.”); id. (“The exaction 
cannot be wrested out of its setting, denominated an excise for raising revenue and 
legalized by ignoring its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a de-
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Turning to the child labor statute, Chief Justice Taft concluded 
that it “regulate[s] by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty” be-
cause it “provides a heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed 
and specified course of conduct in business,” and because 
“[s]cienters [are] associated with penalties not with taxes.”97 The 
Chief Justice noted that the statute does not explicitly prohibit 
child labor, but “it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve 
[this] result by adopting the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its 
principal consequence on those who transgress its standard.”98 The 
Chief Justice feared that recognizing such a penalty as a tax for 
constitutional purposes would end judicially enforceable limits on 
Congress’s enumerated powers.99 The exaction had the expressive 
characteristics of a tax and the material characteristics of a penalty. 
Moreover, the exaction likely would have the effect of a penalty. 
The Court struck it down because materiality dominated expres-
sion in its interpretation of the Constitution.100 
Other decisions from this era similarly distinguished regulatory 
exactions, which the Court deemed to be penalties, from revenue-
raising exactions, which the Court regarded as taxes. In Hill v. Wal-
lace, decided immediately after the Child Labor Tax Case, the 
Court invalidated a federal exaction on sales of grain for future de-
livery (grain future contracts).101 The “tax” was twenty cents a 
sired end. To do so would be to shut our eyes to what all others than we can see and 
understand.” (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37)). 
97 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36–37. 
98 Id. at 38. 
99 The Court wrote that if the exaction at issue was a tax, then Congress could regu-
late all private behavior: 
Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, 
in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number of subjects of 
public interest, jurisdiction of which the States have never parted with, and 
which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a de-
tailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-
called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word “tax” would 
be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and 
completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States. 
Id. 
100 Id. at 39 (“Congress in the name of a tax which on the face of the act is a penalty 
seeks to do the same thing, and the effort must be equally futile.”); id. (“[T]he so-
called tax is a penalty to coerce people of a State to act as Congress wishes them to 
act in respect of a matter completely the business of the state government under the 
Federal Constitution.”). 
101 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922). 
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bushel, which would be imposed unless the contracts were made by 
or through a member of a board of trade recognized by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.102 This exaction supplemented the ex-
isting federal tax of two cents on every hundred dollars in value of 
such sales.103 The Court viewed this “most burdensome” exaction as 
a penalty and not a tax because its “manifest purpose” was “to 
compel boards of trade to comply with regulations, many of which 
have no relevancy to the collection of the tax at all.”104 According 
to the Court, “[t]he act is in essence and on its face a complete 
regulation of boards of trade, with a penalty of 20 cents a bushel on 
all ‘futures’ to coerce boards of trade and their members into com-
pliance.”105 
In United States v. Constantine, the Court invalidated a federal 
exaction on liquor dealers who had violated state liquor laws.106 In 
addition to the $25 excise tax that federal law already imposed on 
retail liquor dealers, the challenged provision imposed a “special 
excise tax” of $1000 on liquor dealers in business contrary to local 
law.107 “If in reality a penalty,” the Court wrote, “it cannot be con-
verted into a tax by so naming it, and we must ascribe to it the 
character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of 
name.”108 The Court ignored “the designation of the exaction,” in-
stead “viewing its substance and application.”109 Because the exac-
tion was “highly exorbitant” relative to other federal taxes on liq-
uor dealers, and because its imposition was conditioned on “the 
commission of a crime,” the Court held that it “exhibits . . . an in-
102 Id. at 63. The other exception to imposition of the tax was “where the seller holds 
and owns the grain at the time of sale, or is the owner or renter of land on which the 
grain is to be grown, or is an association made of such owners or renters.” Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 66. 
105 Id. “When this purpose is declared in the title to the bill, and is so clear from the 
effect of the provisions of the bill itself, it leaves no ground upon which the provisions 
we have been considering can be sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing power.” 
Id. at 66–67. 
106 296 U.S. 287, 295–96 (1935). 
107 Id. at 288–89. 
108 Id. at 294; accord United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (“A tax is 
an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an 
exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act. The two words are not 
interchangeable, one for the other.”). 
109 Constantine, 296 U.S. at 294. 
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tent to prohibit and to punish violations of state law [and thus to] 
remove all semblance of a revenue act, and stamp the sum it exacts 
as a penalty.”110 
After the constitutional crisis of 1937,111 the Court did not for-
mally overrule the Child Labor Tax Case and related decisions. 
The same is true of other pre-1937 precedents that have long since 
been abandoned, including Lochner v. New York.112 Courts, com-
mentators, and litigants presently disagree about whether the 
Court’s tax power decisions from the 1920s and 1930s remain good 
law.113 They agree, however, that the Court sustained federal laws 
when interpreting the scope of the tax power in the decades after 
1937. Thus in Sonzinsky v. United States, the Court upheld as 
within the scope of the tax power a $200 annual license tax on fire-
110 Id. at 295. Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, dissented. 
“Not repression,” Justice Cardozo stressed, “but payment commensurate with the 
gains is . . . the animating motive.” Id. at 297 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
111 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics 45 (1962) (“Serving this value [of laissez faire] in the most 
uncompromising fashion, at a time when it was well past its heyday, five Justices, in a 
series of spectacular cases in the 1920’s and 1930’s, went to unprecedented lengths to 
thwart the majority will. The consequence was very nearly the end of the story.”). For 
a recent account of the political fight over President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
“court-packing” plan, see, e.g.,  Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. 
The Supreme Court (2010); see also Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How 
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution 3–8, 202, 214, 217–29 (2009). 
112 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (reasoning that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects freedom of contract), with W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this freedom? The Con-
stitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). For further discussion of whether 
Lochner remains good law, see Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial 
Dissent, 48 Duke L.J. 243, 244 (1998) (“Lochner is never cited for its legal authority. 
Although it has never been formally overruled, it is well understood among constitu-
tional lawyers that relying on Lochner would be a pointless, if not a self-destructive, 
endeavor.”). 
113 Compare, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 553 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part) 
(“The taxing-power cases, it is true, are old. Yet cases of a certain age are just as 
likely to rest on venerable principles as stale ones, particularly when there is a good 
explanation for their vintage.”), with Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Con-
stitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 Yale L.J. Online 27, 28 (2010), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/5/31/galle.html (“[T]he best reading [of existing doc-
trine] is that courts will not impose any substantive limits on the uses to which Con-
gress may put its taxing authority. Any confusion results from the Court’s failure to 
formally overrule outdated precedents that once suggested otherwise.”). 
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arms dealers.114 The Court appeared to rest on the ground that ex-
actions with regulatory effects are still taxes if they appear, both 
expressively and materially, to have been imposed pursuant to the 
tax power. As to expression, the Court wrote: 
 Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it in-
terposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as com-
pared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax be-
cause it has a regulatory effect, and it has long been established 
that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exer-
cise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is 
burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.115 
The Court declared that “[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which 
may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred 
upon it is beyond the competency of courts.”116 As to materiality, it 
was enough for the Court that the tax “is productive of some reve-
nue” and “operates as a tax.”117 
The Court deferred further in United States v. Sanchez.118 The 
case involved a constitutional challenge to the Marihuana Tax Act, 
which imposed a tax of $100 per ounce on transferors of marijuana 
who make transfers to unregistered transferees without the order 
form required by federal law and without payment by the transfer-
ees of the tax.119 Although it was “obvious” that the law “impos[ed] 
a severe burden on transfers to unregistered persons,”120 the Court 
declared that an exaction is a tax even if it prevents the conduct 
and raises little or no revenue. “It is beyond serious question,” 
wrote the Court, “that a tax does not cease to be valid merely be-
cause it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activi-
ties taxed.”121 Moreover, “the principle applies even though the 
revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of 
114 300 U.S. 506 (1937). 
115 Id. at 513 (citations omitted). 
116 Id. at 513–14. 
117 Id. at 514. 
118 340 U.S. 42 (1950). 
119 Id. at 44. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
COOTER_SIEGEL_BOOK 9/11/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] Not the Power to Destroy 1217 
 
the tax may be secondary.”122 The Court also deemed it significant 
that the tax was “not conditioned upon the commission of a 
crime.”123 The Court thus rejected the claim that Congress had “lev-
ied a penalty, not a tax.”124 
Since Sanchez, the Court has repeatedly refused to invalidate 
exactions on the ground that Congress was using the taxing power 
to regulate conduct. In United States v. Kahriger, the Court upheld 
a federal law imposing a wagering tax of $50 per year on book-
makers, requiring them to register with the Collector of Internal 
Revenue, and penalizing the failure to pay the tax and register.125 
The Court stated that “[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to 
any tax need, courts are without authority to limit the exercise of 
the taxing power.”126 At the same time, the Court stressed that the 
exaction being challenged “produces revenue.”127 
More recently, in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch, the Court distinguished a permissible tax from an imper-
missible punishment in the context of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.128 The Court has long held that the Constitution bans suc-
cessive punishments for the same offense.129 The state of Montana 
sought to impose a “tax” on top of an already imposed criminal 
penalty for illegal possession of a drug. Was this “tax” really a sec-
ond penalty? In Kurth Ranch, the Court invalidated the exaction 
122 Id. (citations omitted). The power of Congress to regulate conduct through taxa-
tion (or conditional expenditures) under the Taxing Clause is not limited to regula-
tion that is otherwise permissible under another enumerated power. See id. (“Nor 
does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress 
might not otherwise regulate.”); The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 470–71 
(1866) (upholding under the tax power a federal law requiring the purchase of a li-
cense before engaging in certain businesses, including intrastate businesses, even 
though “Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control” over “the inter-
nal commerce or domestic trade of the States”). 
123 Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45. 
124 Id. at 43. 
125 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39, 41–42 (1968). 
126 345 U.S. at 31; see id. at 28 (“It is conceded that a federal excise tax does not 
cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is 
the tax invalid because the revenue obtained is negligible.”). 
127 Id. In Bob Jones University v. Simon, the Court acknowledged its abandonment 
of the pre-1937 jurisprudence, which sought to distinguish between “regulatory and 
revenue-raising taxes.” 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). 
128 511 U.S. 767 (1994); see U.S. Const. amend. V. 
129 See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 769 n.1. 
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partly because of its “high rate” and “obvious deterrent purpose,” 
which “lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as pun-
ishment,” but which, “in and of themselves, do not necessarily ren-
der the tax punitive.”130 In addition, the Court stressed that “this so-
called tax is conditioned on the commission of a crime,” a condi-
tion that is “‘significant of penal and prohibitory intent, rather than 
the gathering of revenue.’”131 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court invoked the Child Labor 
Tax Case and stated that “there comes a time in the extension of 
the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its charac-
ter as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of 
regulation and punishment.”132 At the same time, the Court seemed 
to distance itself from the pre-1937 Court’s distinction between 
regulatory and revenue-raising taxes. The Court distinguished ex-
actions imposed on illegal activities both from “taxes with a pure 
revenue-raising purpose that are imposed despite their adverse ef-
fect on the taxed activity[,]” and from “mixed-motive taxes that 
governments impose both to deter a disfavored activity and to raise 
money.”133 The Court thus acknowledged that taxes can raise reve-
nues and also regulate behavior by dampening the conduct subject 
to the tax.134 
130 Id. at 780, 781. 
131 Id. at 781 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)). The 
Court also deemed it significant that the exaction “is exacted only after the taxpayer 
has been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the 
first place,” id., and that the exaction “is levied on goods that the taxpayer neither 
owns nor possesses when the tax is imposed,” id. at 783. 
132 Id. at 779 (citing the Court’s invocation of the Child Labor Tax Case in A. Mag-
nano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934)). 
133 Id. at 782. The Court discussed a cigarette tax to make its point: 
By imposing cigarette taxes, for example, a government wants to discourage 
smoking. But because the product’s benefits—such as creating employment, 
satisfying consumer demand, and providing tax revenues—are regarded as out-
weighing the harm, that government will allow the manufacture, sale, and use of 
cigarettes as long as the manufacturers, sellers, and smokers pay high taxes that 
reduce consumption and increase government revenue. These justifications 
vanish when the taxed activity is completely forbidden, for the legitimate reve-
nue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be equally well served 
by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction. 
Id. This example makes clear that the Court used the term “deter” referenced in the 
text as a synonym for “discourage,” not as a synonym for “prevent.” 
134 Elsewhere in the majority opinion, however, the Court may have overlooked the 
fact that taxes often have the regulatory purpose and effect of dampening behavior in 
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B. Three Insights 
The Court insisted during the 1920s and 1930s that some exac-
tions enacted by Congress may not qualify as “taxes” under the 
Taxing Clause. The dramatic expansion in the scope of the com-
merce power after 1937, however, reduced the importance of the 
constitutional distinction between a tax and a penalty under the 
Taxing Clause.135 Limits on the Commerce Clause imposed by the 
Court in 1995 and again in 2000 renewed the significance of this 
constitutional distinction.136 Federalism doctrine now requires a dis-
tinction between taxing and penalizing that it lacks. 
In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that the Commerce 
Clause does not authorize Congress to criminalize possession of 
firearms in a school zone.137 Imagine that Congress subsequently 
imposed a “tax” of $25,000, enforced by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice through Title 26 of the United States Code, on individuals who 
knowingly possess firearms in school zones, with the exaction in-
creasing by $25,000 for each repetition of the act. It is unlikely that 
the Court would uphold such an exaction as a permissible use of 
the tax power and allow Congress to undermine Lopez so easily. 
How should the Court distinguish taxes from regulations backed 
by penalties? The first clause of Article I, Section 8 explicitly gives 
Congress the power to tax in order to raise revenues and pay debts. 
The first clause also gives Congress the power to tax to promote 
the general welfare. Taxes can promote the general welfare by 
dampening excessive activities. As documented in Part I, many 
federal exactions throughout U.S. history have raised revenues and 
dampened activities perceived as excessive, without one being pri-
mary and the other secondary. Because commonplace taxes serve 
both purposes, the Court has had to draw back from its past at-
tempt to distinguish a tax from a regulation based on whether an 
addition to the non-regulatory purpose and effect of raising revenues. See id. at 779–
80 (“Whereas fines, penalties, and forfeitures are readily characterized as sanctions, 
taxes are typically different because they are usually motivated by revenue-raising, 
rather than punitive, purposes.”). 
135 See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 846 (3d ed. 2000). 
136 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). 
137 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
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exaction raises revenue or regulates behavior, or primarily does 
one and secondarily does the other. 
The Court’s cases provide three insights that will help to distin-
guish taxes and regulations backed by penalties. First, some past 
decisions suggest that the difference between taxing and penalizing 
relates to coercion. The Court has, at times, appreciated that taxes 
are characteristically less coercive than penalties. So, for example, 
the Court during the 1920s and 1930s stressed the sheer magnitude 
of certain exactions and the scienter requirements attached to 
them.138 The Court has recognized indirectly that taxes are less co-
ercive by acknowledging that they raise revenues instead of deter-
ring conduct. The post-1937 Court, in cases like Sonzinsky and 
Kahriger, often observed that the federal exactions it was uphold-
ing would produce revenues.139 
Second, post-1937 decisions understand that the difference be-
tween taxing and penalizing does not depend on whether an exac-
tion raises revenue or regulates behavior. As the Court noted in 
Kurth Ranch,140 an exaction may be designed to raise revenues and 
dampen conduct, not to raise revenues and prevent conduct.  
Third, other past decisions (though not all) follow the basic prin-
ciple of interpretation in tax law that substance dominates form.141 
On this view, an exaction’s material characteristics matter more 
than its expressive characteristics in constitutional review of fed-
eral statutes142 and state laws,143 and in federal statutory interpreta-
138 See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36 (“If an employer departs from this 
prescribed course of business, he is to pay to the government one-tenth of his entire 
net income in the business for a full year. The amount is not to be proportioned in any 
degree to the extent or frequency of the departures, but is to be paid by the employer 
in full measure whether he employs five hundred children for a year, or employs only 
one for a day.”); cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780 (“A significant part of the assess-
ment was more than eight times the drug’s market value—a remarkably high tax.”). 
139 See supra notes 114–17 & 125–27 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
 140 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
141 See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978). 
142 In addition to decisions like the one in the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court in 
The License Tax Cases upheld a federal law under the tax power providing “that no 
persons should be engaged in certain trades or businesses, including those of selling 
lottery tickets and retail dealing in liquors, until they should have obtained a ‘license’ 
from the United States,” which “license” was later relabeled a “special tax” by Con-
gress, on the ground that “[t]he granting of a license . . . must be regarded as nothing 
more than a mere form of imposing a tax.” 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 463, 471 (1866) 
(footnote omitted). The Court praised Congress for substituting the term “special 
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tion.144 The cases contain these three insights, even though several 
cases contradict one another and none is entirely correct in its ra-
tionale. 
The next Part draws from these judicial decisions and improves 
the Court’s tax power doctrine. Because the Court now imposes 
some restrictions on the Commerce Clause, it is unlikely to defer 
completely to Congress concerning the difference between taxes 
and regulations backed by penalties, as it did in the decades follow-
ing the crisis of 1937. The Court requires a viable theory of the tax 
power, one that is consistent with its limits on the commerce 
power. Such a theory cannot result from a doctrinal synthesis, as 
the inconsistencies in the cases across historical eras preclude this 
possibility. Nor, however, can a theory of the tax power ignore the 
cases. The task, rather, is to distinguish between a tax and a penalty 
tax” for “license.” Such “judicious legislation,” the Court wrote, “removed all future 
possibility of error” and “guarded against any misconstruction of the legislative inten-
tion.” Id. at 473. But the Court did not rest its holding on the substitution or intimate 
that the exaction would not have qualified as a tax if Congress had stuck with the 
word “license.” See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits) (“[T]he fact that an 
exaction is not labeled a tax does not vitiate Congress’s power under the Taxing 
Clause.” (citing The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 471)). 
 Similarly, some federal laws refer to exactions on illegal acts as “taxes,” which is 
misleading because the conduct is illegal. But the Court judges the material character-
istics of these exactions without concern for whether they are called legal or illegal. 
See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778 (“As a general matter, the unlawfulness of an 
activity does not prevent its taxation.” (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 
44 (1968); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); United States v. Constantine, 
296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935))). 
143 See, e.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (“In passing 
on the constitutionality of a tax law ‘we are concerned only with its practical opera-
tion, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied 
to it.’” (quoting Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 280 (1932), and citing 
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) and S. Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 
U.S. 167, 177 (1939))). Lawrence, in turn, cited a series of earlier decisions for the 
same proposition. See Lawrence, 286 U.S. at 280 (citing Educ. Films Corp. v. Ward, 
282 U.S. 379, 387 (1931); Pac. Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 (1932); and Shaffer v. 
Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 54–55 (1920)). These cases involved a variety of constitutional 
challenges, most notably dormant commerce and due process objections to state exac-
tions. In all of them, the Court stressed the substance of the exaction over its form. 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. 213, 220 
(1996) (holding in the bankruptcy context that the determination of whether an exac-
tion is a tax requires courts to “look[] behind the label placed on the exaction and rest 
its answer directly on the operation of the provision . . .”). 
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for purposes of Article I, Section 8 by drawing on the Court’s past 
decisions while avoiding analytical errors. 
III. THEORY 
A. Taxes and Penalties: Pure and Mixed 
Regulations backed by penalties and taxes often have distinct 
characteristics. The language of an exaction expresses a value 
judgment about the underlying conduct. The language of penalties 
usually condemns by using words such as “wrong,” “penalty,” 
“punishment,” or “ought not to.” Examples include most criminal 
fines, some regulatory fines, and punitive damages in civil cases. 
Besides expression, an exaction’s material characteristics include 
its magnitude and conditions. A penalty is usually high relative to 
the gain from forbidden conduct for almost everyone, so self-
interest deters wrongdoing.145 The penalty that deters rational peo-
ple may not be enough to deter irrational or unusual people. To 
deter them, a penalty’s magnitude often increases for intentional or 
repeated wrongdoing. Intentionality or recidivism triggers an en-
hancement. Thus an unintentional tort may trigger liability for ac-
tual harm, whereas doing the same act intentionally may trigger 
punitive damages. Similarly, a second criminal offense often trig-
gers a more severe punishment than the first. 
Compared to a penalty, a tax usually has the opposite character-
istics. The language describing the taxed conduct does not forbid or 
condemn it. Rather, the tax is described in the language of choice, 
such as “permitted,” “allowed,” or “neither required nor forbid-
den.” The law explicitly permits the taxed conduct as long as one 
pays the tax, or people infer permission from the absence of a pro-
hibition. The income tax does not condemn earning income, and a 
tax on industrial pollution does not condemn industrial activity. 
145 Determining whether an exaction prevents almost all people from engaging in the 
assessed conduct requires a definition of the relevant universe of people. We define 
this universe as everyone who either pays the exaction or changes her behavior in re-
sponse to it. This limits analysis of the effect of the exaction to the people for whom 
the exaction makes a difference, not the people for whom it is irrelevant. 
COOTER_SIEGEL_BOOK 9/11/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] Not the Power to Destroy 1223 
Other examples of taxes on permitted activities include tariffs, ex-
cises, head taxes, and property taxes.146 
Unlike a penalty, a tax is usually low relative to the gain from 
the taxed conduct for many people. Furthermore, the tax rate does 
not increase for intentional or repeated conduct. Earning income 
intentionally does not affect the income tax rate, and the income 
tax rate does not change just because someone earns income year 
after year.147 
Table 1 summarizes the usual characteristics of penalties and 
taxes. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Exactions 
 Expression Material Characteristics 
  Rate Intentionality, 
Repetition 
Penalty Condemns Relatively high Enhancements 
Tax Permits Relatively low No Enhancements 
 
Whether from conscience or self-interest, these characteristics 
affect behavior predictably. A penalty prevents almost everyone 
from engaging in the forbidden conduct. Almost everyone obeys 
most criminal and regulatory laws most of the time. A tax causes 
many people (but not everyone) to engage in the taxed conduct at 
a reduced rate. A tax dampens conduct without preventing it. The 
income tax does not prevent many people from earning income, al-
though it may cause some to earn less, and a tariff does not prevent 
many people from importing goods, although it may cause them to 
import less. 
Pure penalty is our phrase for an exaction with all of the usual 
characteristics and effects of a penalty.148 A pure penalty condemns 
 
146 Sometimes exactions that are expressively and materially equivalent to taxes are 
not called taxes. For example, “user fees” are taxes (with the tax base being users) be-
cause they signal permission and they do not prevent the conduct in question. 
147 It is theoretically possible for a tax to increase the assessed conduct, as when an 
income tax causes an unusual person to work more in order to replace income taken 
by the tax. This scenario is analogous to very unusual goods whose demand increases 
when the price rises (“Giffin goods”). For our purposes, such an exaction is a tax, not 
a penalty, because it does not prevent the assessed conduct. 
148 Theories in social science often invoke “ideal types,” “stylized facts,” or simpli-
fied models. See, e.g., Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, 
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the assessed conduct, exacts a high cost relative to the gain from 
the forbidden conduct for almost everyone, and enhances the rate 
for intentional or repeated violations. These characteristics prevent 
the conduct and thus raise little or no revenue. Pure tax is our 
phrase for an exaction with all of the usual characteristics and ef-
fects of a tax. A pure tax permits the assessed conduct, exacts a low 
cost relative to the gain from the assessed conduct for many peo-
ple, and does not enhance the rate for intentional or repeated con-
duct. These characteristics dampen the conduct and generate reve-
nue. 
The distinction in pure types illuminates two criteria sometimes 
used to distinguish between penalties and taxes. The first criterion 
is coercion. A pure penalty coerces expressively and materially, 
and its effect is to prevent the assessed conduct. Alternatively, a 
pure tax does not coerce expressively or materially, and its effect is 
to dampen the assessed conduct. 
The second criterion is revenue raising. A pure penalty prevents 
the assessed conduct for almost everyone and thereby raises little 
or no revenue. By contrast, a pure tax dampens the assessed con-
duct but does not prevent it for many people, thereby raising reve-
nues. 
Some jurists, following the lead of the Court during the 1920s 
and 1930s, suggest that the key difference between taxes and regu-
lations backed by penalties concerns raising revenues for the gov-
ernment on the one hand, and changing the behavior of citizens on 
the other.149 According to this suggestion, taxes primarily raise 
revenues, although they may also change behavior, whereas penal-
ties primarily change behavior, although they may also raise reve-
nues. 
The difference between changing behavior and raising revenues, 
however, cannot decide whether an exaction is one or the other. 
Because many taxes do both, this criterion is unworkable, which 
in The Methodology of the Social Sciences 91 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch 
eds., 1949). 
149 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 551 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part) (con-
cluding that the exaction in the Affordable Care Act for remaining uninsured was a 
penalty because, inter alia, its “central function . . . was not to raise revenue,” but “to 
change individual behavior by requiring all qualified Americans to obtain medical in-
surance”). 
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may be why the Supreme Court apparently abandoned it.150 This 
distinction also contradicts contemporary economists and other 
policy experts, who argue that taxes can channel some behavior 
more efficiently than ordinary regulations. Thus environmental 
economists recommend using pollution taxes, not commands, to 
abate air and water pollution.151 
Sometimes a pure tax is levied on a beneficial activity. Dampen-
ing a beneficial activity is an undesirable byproduct of raising tax 
revenues. Thus income taxes raise revenues and dampen earning 
income, and property taxes raise revenues and dampen improve-
ments on property. Economists try to devise taxes that minimize 
the dampening of desirable behavior. 
Conversely, dampening is regarded as a desirable product of tax-
ing activities perceived as excessive, like pollution in the twentieth 
century or imports in the nineteenth century. Economists favor ex-
ternality taxes that dampen excessive behavior optimally. When a 
pure tax is levied on an excessive activity, society benefits from 
dampening the activity and raising revenues for the government.152 
As noted in Part II, the Court stated in Sonzinsky v. United States 
that an exaction qualifies as a tax if it “is productive of some reve-
nue” and it “operates as a tax.”153 An exaction produces revenues 
and operates as a tax if it dampens permitted conduct. Conduct is 
dampened when many people do less of it. Alternatively, an exac-
150 See supra Part II (discussing the doctrinal shift from Child Labor Tax Case, 259 
U.S. 20 (1922), to Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), and United States 
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953)); see also id. (discussing Mont. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994)). 
151 The primary reason that economists advocate pollution taxes is to change behav-
ior, and the secondary reason is to raise revenues. Taxes on excessive behavior, how-
ever, are the ideal means to finance the government because they raise revenues by 
correcting a distortion in market prices, not by creating one. Cf. United States v. 
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 35 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Congress may and should 
place the burden of taxes where it will least handicap desirable activities and bear 
most heavily on useless or harmful ones.”). 
152 The economist’s ideal pollution tax internalizes the social cost of pollution. Such 
a tax is a “price” to increase the cost of a permitted activity, not a “sanction” to pre-
vent wrongdoing. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 
1536 (1984). 
153 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); accord Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 (noting that the exaction 
under review “produces revenue”); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93–94 
(1919) (stating that laws are supported by the tax power only if they bear “some rea-
sonable relation” to the “raising of revenue”). 
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tion raises little or no revenue and operates as a penalty if it pre-
vents forbidden conduct. Conduct is prevented when few people 
do it.154 
Situated between pure taxes and pure penalties are exactions 
with mixed characteristics—the expressive characteristics of a pen-
alty and the material characteristics of a tax, or vice versa. The ex-
action either sounds like a tax and looks like a penalty, or else it 
sounds like a penalty and looks like a tax. Mixed characteristics 
confuse people about what the law requires of them. Some people 
think that overstaying in a metered parking place is wrong because 
the exaction is called a “fine,” while others think that overstaying is 
permitted provided that one pays the fine, because the fine per vio-
lation does not increase for overstaying intentionally or repeatedly. 
What is the correct constitutional interpretation of mixed exac-
tions? When interpreting an exaction, should expressive character-
istics trump material characteristics or should materiality trump 
expression? Our answer depends on the exaction’s effect. If it has 
the effect of a penalty by preventing conduct, then it should be in-
terpreted as a penalty. If it has the effect of a tax by dampening 
conduct and raising revenue, then it should be interpreted as a tax. 
Thus the fine for overstaying in metered parking dampens the con-
duct but does not prevent it. Behavior is dampened because many 
people weigh the value of their time and the expected fine, and 
then decide to overstay in metered parking. They respond to the 
exaction’s material characteristics, which are those of a tax, not to 
its expressive characteristics. In contrast, fines for speeding on the 
highway increase with recidivism, which characterizes penalties. A 
person who persists in speeding sufficiently to attract the police 
will pay higher fines until he loses his license to drive, which pre-
vents the conduct. 
For ordinary taxes, traffic violations, and many other kinds of 
exactions, most people respond to material consequences more 
than to expression (notwithstanding occasional assertions to the 
154 Cf. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 35 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Of course, all taxation has 
a tendency, proportioned to its burdensomeness, to discourage the activity taxed. One 
cannot formulate a revenue-raising plan that would not have economic and social 
consequences.”). 
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contrary).155 This behavior confirms the prediction of price theory 
in economics. The material interpretation of exactions ties the 
meaning of a statute to a deep and reliable human motivation, 
namely self-interest. Absent information to the contrary, the con-
stitutional interpretation of an exaction should respond to its mate-
rial characteristics more than to its expression. Materially identical 
exactions should have the same constitutional consequences re-
gardless of what a statute calls them, unless the facts indicate that 
people will respond more to an exaction’s expression than to its 
material characteristics. 
If the constitutional division of powers means anything, then 
Congress cannot acquire a power that it lacks by calling it a power 
that it has. Otherwise Congress could avoid any constitutional limi-
tation on its powers by the way it refers to them. Congress cannot 
acquire the power to regulate for the general welfare by calling a 
regulation backed by a penalty a “tax.”156 Conversely, Congress 
does not lose a power that it has by calling it a power that it lacks. 
Courts should resist policing statutory vocabulary through judicial 
review, as we discuss in Part IV in connection with the controversy 
over health care reform. 
If materiality presumptively trumps expression when interpret-
ing a mixed exaction, the constitutional division of powers between 
the federal government and the states is preserved. Like Justice 
Holmes, we believe that a reviewing court should “think things, not 
words.”157 Conversely, if expression trumps materiality, then Con-
155 See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 29–30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting as to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits) (“Congress often chooses the 
label ‘penalty’ instead of ‘tax’ because the ‘penalty’ label suggests violation of a legal 
rule and thus has a more powerful effect in altering underlying behavior that Con-
gress wants to encourage or discourage.”); id. at 30 n.11 (quoting statements in a 1999 
Treasury Department Report that “penalties clearly signal that noncompliance is not 
acceptable behavior,” and that “[i]n establishing social norms and expectations, sub-
jecting the noncompliant behavior to any penalty may be as important as the exact 
level of the penalty . . . .”). 
156 See, e.g., United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (“No mere exercise 
of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an 
exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient 
of calling it such.”). 
157 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 
443, 460 (1898–1899) (“We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly 
translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real 
and the true.”). 
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gress controls a statute’s constitutional reach by how Congress re-
fers to constitutional powers, not by the Constitution’s concepts. A 
constitutional distinction between materially equivalent statutes 
would make sense only in circumstances where legal expression 
motivates people more than materiality.158 
The implications of this analysis for the scope of Congress’s tax 
power are straightforward. According to longstanding legal doc-
trine, the Constitution authorizes Congress to impose pure taxes to 
promote the general welfare.159 Congress does not lose its power to 
tax for the general welfare by referring to an exaction as a “regula-
tion” or a “penalty.” Nor does Congress lose its power to tax for 
the general welfare by declining to invoke the Taxing Clause when 
it imposes an exaction.160 Whatever Congress says, the effect of the 
exaction—how it works—matters most. If the exaction has the ef-
fects of a tax, the Constitution authorizes Congress to impose it in 
order to promote the general welfare. 
Table 2 summarizes our conclusion that (1) mixed exactions 
should be interpreted according to their effect, and (2) the usual ef-
fect depends on the material characteristics. For purposes of the 
tax power, “tax equivalents” are exactions that condemn and exact 
at a low rate, which dampens behavior. Conversely, “penalty 
158 For an examination of the importance of the expressive form of legal regulation 
in a different area of constitutional law, see generally Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and 
the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473, 1494–95 (2007); Neil S. 
Siegel, Race–Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and 
Individualized Consideration, 56 Duke L.J. 781, 831, 843 (2006). 
159 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936) (“The true construction [of the 
first clause] undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the pur-
pose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for 
the general welfare.”); see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 16, at 171–72 (“The tenu-
ous economic distinction between many taxes and regulations . . . suggests that allow-
ing one and not the other under Clause 1 makes little sense.”). 
160 See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The question of the 
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power 
which it undertakes to exercise.”). The constitutional question remains whether the 
exaction is a tax. Note, however, that a different situation is presented when Congress 
explicitly disclaims use of a particular enumerated power. As a matter of institutional 
deference, it is appropriate for courts to defer to a clearly articulated congressional 
judgment that an enumerated power is not available or not desirable to justify an Act 
of Congress. But calling an exaction something other than a “tax” does not by itself 
amount to explicit disavowal of the tax power, particularly in light of the case law sug-
gesting that substance controls over form. 
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equivalents” are exactions that permit and exact at a high rate, 
which prevents behavior. 
 
Table 2: Exactions With Mixed Characteristics 
 Condemns Permits 
High Rate 
 
Pure penalty Penalty equivalent 
Low Rate Tax equivalent Pure tax 
 
B. Three Criteria for Distinguishing Taxes and Penalties 
One aim of the Constitution is to limit federal power to coerce 
the states and citizens. To pursue this aim, the Constitution gives 
the federal government limited, enumerated powers, and denies it 
a general police power.161 As noted above, pure penalties coerce 
more than pure taxes, both materially and expressively. Conse-
quently, a concern with federal coercion partly justifies more re-
striction on congressional power to impose penalties than taxes. As 
with other enumerated powers, the constitutional question con-
cerns the exaction’s effect on the general class of conduct subject to 
it.162 An exaction that prevents almost everyone from engaging in 
the conduct is a penalty for constitutional purposes, even though 
the statute calls it a tax. An exaction that exceeds almost every-
one’s gain from engaging in the assessed conduct is too coercive to 
qualify as a tax under the tax power, even if a few people with un-
usual preferences or resources still engage in it. 
A constitutional test for a tax under the tax power and a penalty 
under the Commerce Clause should focus on the effect of the exac-
tion on the conduct of the people subject to it.163 The test of 
 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). 
162 Cf., e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“We have never required Con-
gress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the total inci-
dence of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire 
class.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
163 An effects test necessarily raises the question whether the constitutionality of a 
federal exaction turns in part on enforcement effort. Is an exaction a penalty if it has 
the expressive and material characteristics of a penalty but it is rarely enforced, or is  
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whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty is whether it dampens or 
prevents conduct. An exaction that dampens conduct raises signifi-
cant revenues, and an exaction that prevents conduct does not raise 
significant revenues.   
Three characteristics usually determine whether an exaction 
dampens or prevents conduct. These three characteristics are not 
the constitutional test of an exaction, but they are the most impor-
tant criteria for predicting whether it is a tax or a penalty. We for-
mulate the criteria in three questions about the material character-
istics of an exaction:   
(1) Is the amount of the exaction so high that it exceeds the ex-
pected benefit from engaging in the assessed conduct for almost 
everyone? 
(2) Does the exaction’s amount depend on whether the assessed 
individual has a certain mental state, especially the intention to 
perform the assessed conduct? 
(3) Does the amount of the exaction increase with repetition of 
the assessed conduct?164 
enforced in some parts of the country but not others? We cannot fully explore this 
question here, but we believe that appropriately deferential courts should (and 
would) not take into account the degree of enforcement. Making the interpretation of 
an exaction depend on its enforcement potentially allows the executive branch to de-
termine the constitutionality of congressional statutes and allows their interpretation 
to differ from one place to another. We distinguish the exaction from the means of its 
implementation. The means of implementation can change without affecting the exac-
tion’s character. 
164 Vague words in our theory that cry out for reduction to numbers include “almost 
everyone,” as opposed to “everyone.” 100% is “everyone” and 98% is “almost every-
one.” 51% is a majority, but not “almost everyone.” At what exact point above 51% 
and below 98% does one cross the line between a majority and almost everyone? The 
same questions could be asked in our theory about “little or no revenue” and “no 
revenue,” and about the point at which dampening becomes prevention. Constitu-
tional interpretation often employs notoriously imprecise language. Although impre-
cision is inevitable, the choice of words still matters. There is no line between the 
front of your face and the back of your head, but they are not the same. Thus the 
“preponderance of the evidence” means something different from “beyond a reason-
able doubt,” even though courts refuse to reduce them to exact probabilities. Experts 
may suggest that “preponderance of the evidence” means a probability exceeding 
one-half. This numerical representation has proved useful to scholars who try to un-
derstand the meaning and consequences of the legal standard. Such scholarship and 
testimony presumably influences courts, even though judges refuse to equate the legal 
rule with a precise number. Courts presumably resist reducing legal distinctions to 
precise numbers because legal decisions require combining several qualitative factors, 
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If all of the answers to these questions are “yes,” then the exaction 
will almost certainly prevent conduct, so it is a penalty for purposes 
of the tax power. If none of the answers to the three questions is 
“yes,” then the exaction will almost certainly dampen behavior and 
raise revenues, so it is a tax for purposes of the tax power. When 
these three material characteristics align, there is a strong pre-
sumption that materiality trumps expression. When material char-
acteristics predict effects, an interpretation can be based primarily 
on the former. Expression is then irrelevant to whether an exaction 
is a tax or a penalty because it does not affect behavior. The align-
ment of these material characteristics can decide many cases, in-
cluding the ACA’s minimum insurance requirement, as we show 
later.165
and a precise formula suggests more precision than decision makers can achieve in 
fact. 
 Courts that rely on our theory would have the same reason to resist identifying our 
vague terms with precise numbers as with the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. Our theory identifies magnitude, intentionality, and recidivism as criteria to dis-
tinguish taxes from penalties. By reducing three criteria to a single magnitude, the 
courts would suggest more precision in combining them than decision makers can ac-
tually achieve. Courts should leave debate on line drawing to case-by-case adjudica-
tion and commentary by others, as do we. 
165 We focus on these three criteria because they connect the characteristics of the 
exaction to its incentive effects on behavior. Many considerations that are not charac-
teristics of an exaction affect how a person responds to it, such as the person’s taste 
and income. Considerations unconnected to the exaction’s character should remain in 
the background, such as (1) the entity charged with assessing the exaction or similar 
decisions about the means of implementation; (2) the uses to which the government 
will put the revenue generated by the exaction; and (3) the location of the exaction in 
the U.S. Code. Another such example is whether the exaction is imposed only after 
detection by the police. Although some penalties are imposed only after police detec-
tion, others are not. For an instance in which the Court erred by confusing the effects 
of an exaction with who enforces it, see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958) (holding that the Commissioner properly disallowed the tax 
deductibility of payments of several hundred fines imposed on a trucking business for 
violations of state maximum weight laws because “the truckers were fined by the 
State as a penal measure when and if they were apprehended by the police.”). For an 
effective critique of the decision as promoting inefficient behavior through the tax 
code where efficient behavior would accord with the state’s goal of obtaining com-
pensation for damage done to its roads, see Richard Schmalbeck & Lawrence Zele-
nak, Federal Income Taxation 536–38 (3d ed. 2011). 
 In addition, the social costs imposed by the conduct subject to an exaction are not 
relevant to whether the exaction is a tax or a penalty. Purely self-interested people 
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By contrast, misalignment weakens the inference of effects from 
material characteristics. If some of the answers to the first three 
questions are “yes” and some are “no,” then the exaction’s effects 
depend on how people weight these characteristics. Will the exac-
tion raise revenues and dampen the conduct, or will it prevent the 
conduct? This question demands direct evidence about behavior, 
not a presumption based on its characteristics. In hard cases, the 
question of effects is empirical, not theoretical.166  
The courts, the Congress, the President, civil servants, and ordi-
nary citizens need to understand the Constitution’s meaning in or-
der to conform to it. In certain settings, some actors have the legal 
obligation to defer to another’s interpretation of the Constitution. 
The constitutional meaning of a statutory exaction, which is this 
Article’s subject, is distinct from the obligation of deference in in-
terpreting the statute. Specifically, the constitutional meaning of a 
tax and a penalty is distinct from the question of whether and how 
courts should exercise judicial review of an exaction’s constitution-
ality.167
care only about their private costs, not about social costs. Most people care more 
about their private costs than social costs. An exaction by the state imposes a private 
cost on a person’s conduct. Most people respond by comparing the exaction to their 
private benefit from the conduct. Grounding a theory of the difference between a tax 
and penalty on its behavioral consequences requires a focus on private costs and 
benefits. By contrast, the social costs imposed by certain conduct are relevant to 
whether the conduct should be regulated by a tax or a penalty. A tax that internalizes 
social costs causes a self-interested person to do what is best for society, and the in-
ability to design and implement such a tax is an important reason for imposing a pen-
alty. 
166  Given three binary criteria, there are two permutations that align and six that 
misalign. The most that can be said in the abstract is that the relative level of the exac-
tion ordinarily will matter most—both the initial level and the amounts of any en-
hancements for recidivism. For example, a huge exaction with no enhancements will 
prevent more conduct than a small exaction with small enhancements that never ap-
proximate the huge exaction. 
 The question is especially difficult when the exaction applies to conduct that most 
people engage in once or not at all, but not twice. Thus a tax on home ownership 
dampens it by preventing marginal homeowners from buying houses. The question is 
also difficult for exactions with enhancements for intentional or repeated conduct that 
most people engage in, such as driving faster than the speed limit. 
167 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in The Constitution in 
2020, at 11, 20 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (“Many theories of con-
stitutional interpretation conflate two different questions. The first is the question of 
what the Constitution means and how to be faithful to it. The second asks how a per-
son in a particular institutional setting—like an unelected judge with life tenure—
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Judicial review in tax power cases defers to Congress in two 
ways. First, the presumption of constitutionality in enumerated-
powers litigation requires courts to uphold a contested exaction in 
close cases.168 Second, in Commerce Clause cases, the Court asks 
whether Congress had a rational basis to believe that the regulated 
subject matter would substantially affect interstate commerce in 
the aggregate—not whether those effects in fact materialized.169 So 
too, here, the question for judicial resolution is whether Congress 
could have rationally concluded that the exaction would have the 
effect of a tax—not whether the exaction actually had that effect or 
was certain to have it. 
According to our theory, the constitutional difference between a 
tax and a penalty depends on the whether it dampens or prevents 
conduct. Our theory, however, does not require the courts to make 
this determination. Under the preceding deference logic, the courts 
have to decide whether Congress could have rationally concluded 
that an exaction would dampen conduct. If a reviewing court de-
cides that Congress could have rationally concluded that an exac-
tion would dampen conduct and not prevent it, the court should 
defer to Congress and decide that the exaction is a tax. 
Deference also affects the stability of the interpretation of a stat-
ute. Consider a statute with the expression of a penalty and the ma-
terial characteristics of a tax. Perhaps people initially and unchar-
acteristically respond to the expression, but over time idealism 
wanes and self-interest waxes until people eventually become indif-
ferent to the expression and respond only to materiality. Thus the 
statute initially prevents conduct and finally dampens it.   
should interpret the Constitution and implement it through doctrinal constructions 
and applications.”). 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for 
the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a 
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional bounds. With this presumption of constitutionality in mind, we turn to 
the question whether [the statute] falls within Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, of 
the Constitution.” (citations omitted)). 
169 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a 
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the ag-
gregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational 
basis’ exists for so concluding.”). 
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Does the change in the statute’s effects also change its constitu-
tional meaning? This is a general question about interpreting stat-
utes when their effects change, not a special question about taxes 
and penalties. Thus consider a federal statute regulating an activity 
with an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce when enacted 
and a substantial effect later. Could such a statute fail constitu-
tional review under the Commerce Clause initially and pass it sub-
sequently? The Court has never considered such a question, pre-
sumably because it seldom (if ever) arises. Several different 
resolutions of the problem are possible.170 
Under our test, whether Congress calls an exaction a “tax” is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the exaction to fall within the 
scope of the tax power. Some of the Court’s past decisions, how-
ever, suggest that calling an exaction a “tax” is necessary and suffi-
cient for it to be one constitutionally,171 and some suggest the oppo-
site, as we noted in Part II. Making the tax power turn on a 
jurisprudence of labels is inconsistent with the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. If using the “T” word were sufficient to jus-
tify an exaction under the tax power, then a court would have to 
approve a $25,000 federal “tax” on carrying a gun in a school zone 
after Lopez. And because the effects of an exaction turn primarily 
on its material characteristics, not its expressive characteristics, 
Congress need not use the “tax” label in order to rely on the tax 
power.172 
170 Perhaps deference to Congress requires a reviewing court to examine the ex-
pected effect of the exaction at the time of enactment. The question is what the enact-
ing Congress rationally could have concluded at the time of enactment. Or perhaps 
deference to Congress requires a reviewing court to examine the expected effect of 
the exaction at the time of litigation. Or perhaps the most appropriate deference ap-
proach is to uphold the exaction if it had the constitutionally required effects either at 
the time of enactment or at the time of litigation. Alternatively, the court could not 
defer to Congress and ask whether exaction’s effect at the time of litigation is to pre-
vent or dampen conduct. These are just some of the possibilities. 
171 Veazie Bank, McCrary, and Sanchez can be read that way. See supra Section II.A 
(discussing these cases). 
172 Some exactions are neither taxes nor penalties. For example, there are federal 
regulations backed by exactions that are called “penalties” by Congress. They are low 
and lack enhancement, however, so they lack the three material characteristics of 
pure penalties. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2006) (“The Secretary of Agriculture is 
authorized, with the approval of the President, to make such regulations with the 
force and effect of law as may be necessary to carry out the powers vested in him by 
this chapter. Any violation of any regulation shall be subject to such penalty, not in 
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In sum, we agree with Holmes that materiality matters more 
than expression “on the very quesetion [sic] whether a given statu-
tory liability is a penalty or a tax.”173 “A bad man,” Holmes wrote, 
does not care “whether conduct is legally right or wrong, and also 
whether a man is under compulsion or free.”174 This is because “[i]t 
does not matter, so far as the given consequence, the compulsory 
payment, is concerned, whether the act to which it is attached is 
described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or whether the 
law purports to prohibit it or to allow it.”175 Unlike Holmes, how-
ever, we think expression counts for something. Whether an exac-
tion dampens or prevents conduct depends on the responses of 
many different people, not just “bad people.” What counts is the 
total effect on conduct, not just the effect on bad people. 
Like Holmes, our approach grants the federal government ro-
bust power to raise revenues and dampen behavior through taxa-
tion, as it has enjoyed throughout American history. Holmes, how-
ever, famously denied that the “power to tax involves the power to 
destroy,”176 at least “while th[e] Court sits.”177 We agree, which is 
excess of $100, as may be provided therein.”). At the same time, they are not well de-
scribed as taxes because they are so low that they do not raise much revenue. At 
most, they have one characteristic of pure taxes (dampening behavior). What should 
exactions be called when neither “penalties” nor “taxes” accurately describes them? 
“Exactions” may be the best term. Regardless of the label, they need not originate in 
the House of Representatives. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7 (“All Bills for raising Reve-
nue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . .”). 
173 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 173 
(1920); see id. (“But from his point of view, what is the difference between being 
fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing?”). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 174. 
176 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819) (stressing that it is a 
“proposition[] not to be denied” that the “power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy”). Chief Justice Marshall was referring specifically to taxes imposed on the fed-
eral government by the states, which are not governments of limited, enumerated 
powers. We offer a precise formulation of the meaning of “destroy” as “preventing 
the behavior completely.” 
177 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (“The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits. 
The power to fix rates is the power to destroy if unlimited, but this Court while it en-
deavors to prevent confiscation does not prevent the fixing of rates. A tax is not an 
unconstitutional regulation in every case where an absolute prohibition of sales would 
be one.” (citing Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 162 (1907)). 
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why we deny that the federal government may invoke the tax 
power to justify preventing conduct. 
IV. APPLICATION 
Constitutional litigation over the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (“ACA”) focused primarily on the “Requirement to 
Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage,” which opponents call the 
“individual mandate.” It provides that every “applicable individ-
ual”—that is, most individuals lawfully living in the United 
States—“shall” obtain “minimum essential coverage” for each 
month.178 Applicable individuals who do not obtain minimum es-
sential coverage must include in their federal taxes for the year a 
“[s]hared responsibility payment” based on household income, 
which the statute labels a “penalty.”179 (Individuals who need not 
pay the exaction form a heterogeneous group of mostly disadvan-
taged people.180) In 2014, the annual exaction for remaining unin-
sured will be the greater of $95 or 1 percent of income. By 2016, 
the annual exaction will be the greater of $695 or 2.5 percent of in-
come.181 
The minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility 
payment address two free rider problems. Anyone can be griev-
ously injured or fall ill at any moment, and such injury or illness 
can be financially ruinous.182 Almost all who are grievously injured 
or ill will end up at emergency rooms, where they will receive 
treatment regardless of whether they are insured.183 This fact en-
178 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. 2011). The minimum coverage provision goes into 
effect on January 1, 2014. It applies to U.S. citizens and legal residents. It does not 
apply to undocumented aliens, people in prison, and people with certain religious ob-
jections. See id. § 5000A(d). 
179 Id. § 5000A(b)(1). 
180 Individuals who need not pay the exaction include those who need not file a fed-
eral income tax return because their household incomes are too low, people whose 
premium payments would be greater than eight percent of their household income, 
individuals who are uninsured for short periods of time, members of Native American 
tribes, and people who show that compliance with the requirement would impose a 
hardship. Id. § 5000A(e). 
181 Id. § 5000A(c). 
182 See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(G) (Supp. 2011) (“62 percent of all personal bankrupt-
cies are caused in part by medical expenses.”). 
183 Federal law requires hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency 
services (almost all hospitals in the United States) to provide stabilizing care to pa-
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courages financially able individuals to decline to purchase health 
insurance and to free ride on the benevolence of others. The mini-
mum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment are de-
signed in part to overcome risk taking in reliance on benevolence.184 
These two provisions also ameliorate a second kind of free rider 
problem: adverse selection in insurance markets.185 Individuals in 
bad health have an immediate reason to purchase insurance that 
individuals in good health lack. As more people in bad health pur-
chase insurance, the premiums must rise, which causes fewer peo-
ple in good health to buy insurance, which causes a further increase 
in premiums, which causes fewer people in good health to buy in-
surance, and so on. This price spiral exists in unregulated health in-
surance markets without the ACA. To dampen the price spiral, the 
ACA requires both the healthy and the unhealthy to buy insurance 
or pay a yearly fee. Thus the exaction for noninsurance ameliorates 
a problem in insurance markets. 
Some provisions of the ACA, however, also aggravate this price 
spiral. Specifically, the ACA prohibits insurance companies from 
denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, canceling insur-
ance absent fraud, charging higher premiums based on medical his-
tory, and imposing lifetime limits on benefits.186 By guaranteeing 
tients who enter their emergency rooms while experiencing medical emergencies re-
gardless of their ability to pay. Id. § 1395dd(a). This law reinforces the longstanding 
mission of many hospitals to provide care to individuals who are unable to pay fully or 
at all. See, e.g., Charles Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s 
Hospital System 347 (1995) (observing that “the hospital never assumed the guise of 
rational and rationalized economic actor during the first three-quarters of the twenti-
eth century”; that it “continued into the twentieth century, as it had begun in the 
eighteenth, to be clothed with public interest in a way that challenged categorical dis-
tinctions between public and private”; and that “[p]rivate hospitals had always been 
assumed to serve the community at large—treating the needy.”); id. at 352 (seeing 
“little prospect of hospitals in general becoming monolithic cost minimizers and profit 
maximizers,” and predicting that American society “will feel uncomfortable with a 
medical system that does not provide a plausible (if not exactly equal) level of care to 
the poor and socially isolated”); see also, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 42–43, Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058) 
(discussing state tort law creating liability for failure to provide emergency care). 
184 For development of this argument, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on 
Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 29, 33 (2012). 
185 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing (2d ed. 
1974). 
186 42 U.S.C. § 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12. 
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access to health insurance regardless of medical condition, these 
regulations encourage healthy people to postpone buying it until 
they require expensive medical care. When healthy people post-
pone buying health insurance until they need expensive care, the 
average insurance claim per insured person increases, so insurance 
companies need to charge higher rates in order to cover the claims. 
When the insurance rates go up, more healthy postpone buying 
health insurance, which causes another increase in insurance rates, 
and so on. Insurance prices spiral upwards.187 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB,188 which we dis-
cuss at the end of this Part, the federal courts disagreed whether 
the minimum coverage provision is within the scope of the Com-
merce Clause,189 either alone or in combination with the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.190 Three federal district courts and two federal 
courts of appeals upheld the provisions based partly on cost shift-
ing and adverse selection.191 Three other federal district courts and 
one federal court of appeals struck down the provisions on the 
ground that they regulate “inactivity,” which (according to those 
courts) Congress may not reach using its commerce power.192 
187 See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 3, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058) (“Without an individual mandate requirement, more indi-
viduals will make the rational economic decision to wait to purchase coverage until 
they expect to need health care services. If imposed without an individual mandate 
provision, the market reform provisions would reinforce this ‘wait-and-see’ approach 
by allowing individuals to move in and out of the market as they expect to need cov-
erage, undermining the very purpose of insurance to pool and spread risk.”). The 
mechanism causing such a price spiral was famously modeled by George Akerlof in 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. 
Econ. 488 (1970). 
188 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
189 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
190 Id. cl. 18. 
191 See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 35 (D.D.C. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. 
Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895–96 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
192 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1111 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebe-
lius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010). These district courts reasoned that 
Congress may regulate only economic activity using its commerce power, and that the 
minimum coverage provision regulates inactivity—specifically, the failure to purchase 
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Whatever the pertinence of the activity-inactivity distinction to 
the commerce power, it is irrelevant to the scope of the tax power. 
Instead of activity, some taxes are assessed on status, such as own-
ing idle land, receiving dividends from passive investments, enjoy-
ing unearned income, and inheriting wealth. “Head taxes,” which 
the Constitution calls “Capitation” taxes, assess people for being 
alive.193 Moreover, some tax rates increase for inactivity. Thus het-
erosexual couples in long-term relationships with only one wage 
earner often face higher taxes for the “inactivity” of not marry-
ing.194 If the minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility 
payment were justified by the tax power, the activity-inactivity dis-
tinction would be irrelevant. 
Before NFIB, however, no federal court upheld these provisions 
of the ACA under the tax power.195 For example, in his influential 
and dispositive opinion, the widely respected jurist Jeffrey Sutton 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected 
a facial Commerce Clause challenge to the provisions, but con-
cluded that “[t]he individual mandate is a regulatory penalty, not a 
revenue-raising tax.”196 He so concluded because “that is what 
health insurance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rea-
soned similarly in invalidating the minimum coverage provision. Florida ex rel. Att’y 
Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
193 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (contemplating federal power to impose capitation 
taxes under certain circumstances). 
194 Federal law permits married heterosexuals couples to file joint tax returns. If the 
couple has only one wage earner, filing a joint return usually reduces their total tax 
liability. Conversely, if the couple has two earners, filing a joint return usually in-
creases their total tax liability. Unmarried individuals in long-term relationships may 
not file jointly, nor may married gay couples. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6013-1 (2012). 
195 But cf. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 415 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., 
concurring) (“[W]ere I to reach the merits, I would uphold the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority to enact the indi-
vidual and employer mandates under its plenary taxing power.”). In two decisions, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled for the federal govern-
ment on jurisdictional grounds. See id. at 414–15 (holding that the federal tax Anti-
Injunction Act bars the action); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 
266, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Virginia lacks Article III standing to bring the 
action). Unlike Judge Wynn, Judge Motz, who wrote both opinions, did not express 
her view of the merits. Judge Davis would have upheld the individual and employer 
mandates under the Commerce Clause. See Geithner, 671 F.3d at 452 (Davis, J., dis-
senting). 
196 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 550 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., 
concurring in part). 
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Congress said”;197 because “the legislative findings in the Act show 
that Congress invoked its commerce power, not its taxing author-
ity”;198 because “Congress showed throughout the Act that it un-
derstood the difference between these terms and concepts, using 
‘tax’ in some places and ‘penalty’ in others”;199 because “the central 
function of the mandate was not to raise revenue” but “to change 
individual behavior by requiring all qualified Americans to obtain 
medical insurance”;200 and because “case law supports this conclu-
sion.”201 In the view of Judge Sutton (and other federal judges), this 
part of the ACA plainly imposes a penalty and not a tax.202 
Our analysis of four types of exactions—pure taxes, pure penal-
ties, tax equivalents, and penalty equivalents—identifies why 
courts were reluctant to view the ACA’s exaction for noninsurance 
as a tax for constitutional purposes. Not only did Congress refer-
ence a “Requirement” to maintain minimum coverage and provide 
that every applicable individual “shall” obtain it,203 but it also used 
the label “penalty” many times in the statute creating the provi-
sion.204 Moreover, Congress did so after labeling the exaction a 
“tax” in earlier versions of the bill.205 This choice of words is not ar-
bitrary, thoughtless, or expressively interchangeable. On the con-
trary, such normative language appears to reflect a congressional 
judgment that failing to insure is wrong because it shifts medical 




201 Id. at 552 (discussing, inter alia, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922), 
and Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)). 
202 See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Beginning with the district court in this case, all have 
found, without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory pen-
alty, not a tax.” (citing cases)). 
203 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. 2011). 
204 Id. at § 5000A(b), (c); see Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 424 (4th Cir. 
2011) (Davis, J., dissenting) (“And Congress did not simply use the term ‘penalty’ in 
passing: Congress refers to the exaction no fewer than seventeen times in the relevant 
provision, and each time Congress calls it a ‘penalty.’”). 
205 Geithner, 671 F.3d at 424 (Davis, J., dissenting) (“Congress considered earlier 
versions of the individual mandate that clearly characterized the exaction as a ‘tax’ 
and referred to it as such more than a dozen times. Congress deliberately deleted all 
of these references to a ‘tax’ in the final version of the Act and instead designated the 
exaction a ‘penalty.’” (citations omitted)). 
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costs to others. The minimum coverage provision expresses a pen-
alty. 
The contrary argument can be made that the ACA exaction for 
noninsurance expresses a tax. Congress placed the exaction in the 
Internal Revenue Code; identified the individuals subject to the 
exaction as “taxpayers”; calculated the exaction in part as a “per-
centage of . . . the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable 
year”; and included the amount owed in the taxpayer’s tax return 
liability.206 Congress, in short, also used the language of taxation. 
These observations, however, cannot overcome the fact that Con-
gress repeatedly labeled the exaction a “penalty,” it never labeled 
the exaction a “tax,” and it did so after having previously called it a 
“tax” in earlier versions of the bill that became law. 
Even so, courts were wrong to conclude that the ACA exaction 
for noninsurance is a penalty for purposes of the tax power. To dis-
tinguish between what an exaction is called and how it will work, 
the law must supply details on how it applies. The ACA describes 
the material characteristics of the exaction in sufficient detail to de-
termine its likely effects. Each of our three criteria for distinguish-
ing a tax from a penalty indicates that the ACA exaction is a tax. 
First, when an exaction’s rate gets very high, it prevents people 
from engaging in the assessed conduct, coercing them much like a 
penalty. For many people, the shared responsibility payment is too 
low to have this effect.207 This exaction increases with income until 
it hits a cap at “the national average premium for qualified health 
plans which have a bronze level of coverage,” the lowest level of 
health insurance coverage identified by the ACA as sufficient to 
comply with the minimum coverage provision.208 The exaction costs 
less than this minimum level of insurance for many people, so 
206 Cf., e.g., Geithner, 671 F.3d at 418 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“Notably, while the in-
dividual mandate in some places used the term ‘penalty,’ some form of the word ‘tax’ 
appears in the statute over forty times.”); Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Afford-
able Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional Compromise, 120 Yale L.J. Online 
407, 409 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/4/5/galle.html (stressing 
these facts in arguing that the exaction is a tax). 
207 Cong. Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain 
Health Insurance, June 16, 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/eliminate_individual_mandate_06_16.pdf (predicting that 
elimination of the individual mandate to obtain coverage “would increase the number 
of uninsured by about 16 million people”). 
208 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B), (b)(1), (c)(2)(B). 
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many people who want to remain uninsured will do so.209 The exac-
tion’s level apparently reflects a political compromise that aims to 
discourage people from going without insurance without coercing 
them.210 
Second, the exaction has no mens rea requirement. It does not 
matter whether an individual declines to obtain health insurance 
intentionally or innocently. Third, there is no surcharge for recidi-
vism. The amount of the exaction does not increase with each 
month or year that an individual declines to obtain health insur-
ance coverage. Instead, the law imposes a flat fee regardless of an 
individual’s insurance status in previous years. 
Because the shared responsibility payment has all of the material 
characteristics of a tax, it should work like a tax by dampening (but 
not preventing) behavior and thereby raising revenues from the 
uninsured.211 The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates 
that four million people each year will choose to make the shared 
209 See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, The Individual Mandate: How It Will Work, in The 
Staff of the Washington Post, Landmark: The Inside Story of America’s New Health-
Care Law and What It Means for Us All 89 (2010) (“[T]he law expressly states that 
failure to pay the penalties will not result in criminal prosecution or even in property 
liens. Also, the government probably will enforce the mandate loosely because of the 
political sensitivity of the health-care law.”). 
210 Experts fear that the existing exaction may be too low to prevent a significant 
percentage of individuals from delaying the purchase of insurance, which could 
threaten the viability of the insurance business. See, e.g., id. (“[T]hose who wrote the 
legislation set the penalty for not carrying health coverage lower than what many 
health-care experts believe is necessary for the mandate to work, precisely because 
they were worried about the political fallout from making the requirement seem too 
onerous.”); Editorial, Curing a Sick System: The ‘Individual Mandate’ is Divisive, But 
It’s Also a Crucial Component of Healthcare Reform, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 2010, at 
A39, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/24/opinion/la-ed-health-20101024 
(“By requiring all adult Americans and legal residents to obtain a basic level of cov-
erage or else pay an annual tax penalty of up to $2,085, the law seeks to deter people 
from signing up for insurance only after they need expensive care. It’s not the only 
approach Congress could have taken, and it isn’t perfect—the penalty seems too low 
to stop healthy people from going without coverage or employers from ceasing to of-
fer health benefits to their employees.”). 
211 The distinction between dampening and prevention is meaningful as applied to 
the general class of individuals subject to the ACA exaction for noninsurance, not as 
applied to each individual who is so subject. A given individual either obtains insur-
ance or does not. “Dampening” here means that a significant number of people re-
main uninsured despite the provision. “Prevention” means that almost no one re-
mains uninsured. 
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responsibility payment instead of obtaining coverage.212 The CBO 
further predicts that the required payment provision will produce 
$54 billion in federal revenue from 2015 to 2022.213 
The unfolding politics of the Affordable Care Act cannot change 
this conclusion. Opponents of the ACA charge that Congress 
changed the label of the exaction from “tax” to “penalty” to blunt 
the opposition of people committed to no new taxes.214 Labeling an 
exaction a “penalty” instead of a “tax” may “carr[y] political bene-
fits” at a particular time.215 
Some judges and scholars fear that the federal government will 
escape political accountability if it can call an exaction one thing in 
the political arena and something else in court.216 It is a novel 
proposition, however, that political accountability through accurate 
212 Cong. Budget Office, Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/individual_mandate_penalt
ies-04-22.pdf [hereinafter Cong. Budget Office, Payments of Penalties] (reporting that 
“[i]n total, about 4 million people are projected to pay a penalty because they will be 
uninsured in 2016 (a figure that includes uninsured dependents who have the penalty 
paid on their behalf)”). 
213 Cong. Budget Office, Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act, Table 2, Mar. 2012, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Estimates.pdf [hereinafter Cong. Budget Office, Updated 
Estimates]. 
214 Congress may not have considered the potential constitutional consequences of 
changing the label of the exaction in light of Supreme Court decisions that have de-
clared the legal irrelevance of the label affixed to an exaction. See supra notes 142–44 
and accompanying text (citing past Court decisions). 
215 Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 411 n.12 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Florida ex 
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1142–
43 (N.D. Fla. 2010)). Ironically, Congress tried to diminish political objections by us-
ing the name that signals more coercion (“penalty”), instead of the one that signals 
less coercion (“tax”). 
216 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[N]ow that it has passed into law . . . , gov-
ernment attorneys have come into this court and argued that it was a tax after all. This 
rather significant shift in position, if permitted, could have the consequence of allow-
ing Congress to avoid the very same accountability that was identified by the govern-
ment’s counsel in the Virginia case as a check on Congress’s broad taxing power in 
the first place.” (citations omitted)); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: 
Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
Liberty 581, 632 (2010) (“The public is acutely aware of tax increases. Rather than 
incur the political cost of imposing a general tax on the public using its tax powers, 
economic mandates allow Congress and the President to escape accountability for tax 
increases by compelling citizens to make payments directly to private companies.”). 
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labeling applies to Congress’s tax power.217 We are unaware of con-
stitutional authority for the proposition that an exaction with the 
material characteristics and effects of a tax must be deemed a pen-
alty in order to achieve political accountability. Thus Judge Kava-
naugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in an im-
portant opinion in an ACA case, deemed it constitutionally 
irrelevant that the ACA labeled the exaction for noninsurance a 
“penalty” instead of a tax.218 
In any event, political accountability regarding federal exactions 
usually turns on who must pay and how much they must pay, not 
on the exaction’s name. In spite of naming the exaction a “penalty” 
instead of a “tax,” neither the Congress that passed the ACA nor 
the President who signed it into law escaped political accountabil-
ity for supporting the minimum coverage provision, which remains 
controversial. 
Many federal statutes have titles and preambles that misstate 
their content, whether by calling civilian expenditures “military” or 
by declaring high-minded purposes for self-serving logrolls.219 For 
decades Congress has hidden tax breaks in the tax code instead of 
exposing them in the budget, as noted in Part I.220 The Court has 
never suggested that any of these practices raise concerns about 
217 Federal commandeering of states raises different constitutional questions. See 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). With commandeering, the federal government is regulating individuals indi-
rectly by requiring the states to regulate on its behalf. With a purchase mandate or 
incentive, the federal government is regulating individuals directly and so does not 
implicate any structural concern. 
218 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing as to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits) (quoted supra note 142). Like the 
Fourth Circuit, see supra note 195, Judge Kavanaugh would have held the action 
barred by the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act (“TAIA”), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
For a novel explanation of why the TAIA imposed no jurisdictional impediment, see 
generally Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: Why the 
Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage 
Provision, 121 Yale L.J. Online 389 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/1042.pdf. 
219 For a discussion, see generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the 
Power of the Purse, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 191 (1992). Professor Rose-Ackerman 
offers proposals that “aim to improve the accountability of Congress to the vot-
ers . . .by limiting Congress’s ability to make low-visibility deals through the appro-
priations process . . . [and by deterring] Congress from passing ambitious-sounding 
laws that it has no intention of funding adequately.” Id. at 192. 
220 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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the constitutionality of federal taxes or expenditures.221 If the Court 
were to impose a “clear statement” requirement that the tax power 
justifies an exaction only if Congress labels it a “tax,” many other 
kinds of mislabeling logically should fall under such a require-
ment.222 Policing these practices would require a massive judicial 
undertaking. A court that wishes to do so might start with easy 
cases that are blatantly misleading, not subtle cases like the 
ACA.223 
221 Some sections of the Internal Revenue Code mislabel penalties as taxes, notably 
the rules regarding private foundations. Among other things, a foundation must dis-
tribute at least five percent of its assets for charitable purposes each year; it must not 
engage in acts of self-dealing with foundation insiders; it must not hold more than in-
substantial interests in corporate or noncorporate businesses; and (with few excep-
tions) it must not lobby. These rules, however, are not phrased as mandates or prohi-
bitions. Rather, a foundation can do what it wants, but must pay “excise taxes” if it 
chooses wrong. For example, section 4941(a) imposes a first-tier tax of ten percent on 
any self-dealing transaction. 26 U.S.C. § 4941(a) (2006). Section 4941(b) imposes a 
two hundred percent tax on any act of self-dealing subject to the tier-one tax, if the 
act that triggered the tax is not “corrected” in a timely fashion. Id. § 4941(b). The 
first-tier tax grabs attention and the second-tier tax prevents wrongdoing if the foun-
dation does not fix the problem. Unsurprisingly, these “taxes” raise negligible reve-
nue. 
222 To preserve federalism values, the Court needs to distinguish between taxes and 
penalties. The direct approach of distinguishing between them on the merits can suc-
ceed because a substantial theory lies behind the difference, as this Article shows. In 
other areas of constitutional law, the Court may seek to preserve federalism values by 
avoiding substantial distinctions, imposing a clear statement rule, and allowing legisla-
tive politics to take its course. After South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the 
Court may have believed that imposing a clear statement requirement in conditional 
spending cases was the most judicially manageable way to enforce federalism values. 
Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). (The 
Medicaid holding in NFIB may reveal a different belief, but that is a subject for a fu-
ture paper.) Similarly, imposing a clear statement requirement for a suspension of ha-
beas corpus by Congress may enable courts to avoid profound and perplexing ques-
tions about justiciability and the merits. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008). Whatever one thinks about the spending power or habeas suspensions, the 
best approach in the tax context is for the Court to distinguish between a tax and a 
penalty. 
223 It may be easier to identify instances in which Congress calls a penalty a “tax” 
than it is to find situations in which Congress labels a tax a “penalty.” The shared re-
sponsibility payment is unusual in this regard. But cf. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 
268, 275 (1978) (“We . . . cannot agree . . . that the ‘penalty’ language of Internal 
Revenue Code § 6672 is dispositive of the status of respondent’s debt under Bank-
ruptcy Act § 17a(1)(e). . . . That the funds due are referred to as a ‘penalty’ when the 
Government later seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as 
taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act . . . .”).   
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Judge Kavanaugh, however, voiced a distinct expressive concern: 
“Section 5000A arguably does not just incentivize certain kinds of 
lawful behavior but also mandates such behavior,” with the conse-
quence that “a citizen who does not maintain health insurance 
might be acting illegally.”224 In his view, the “Taxing Clause has not 
traditionally authorized a legal prohibition or mandate, as opposed 
to just a financial disincentive or incentive.”225 Although recogniz-
ing “that a legal mandate with a civil tax penalty for non-
compliance is economically indistinguishable from a traditional 
regulatory tax if the amounts of the exactions are the same,” Judge 
Kavanaugh responded that “[s]uch an argument assumes that citi-
zens care only about economic incentives and not also about com-
plying with The Law.”226 He noted the plaintiffs’ argument that 
“the United States does not necessarily consist of 310 million peo-
ple who have over-absorbed their Posner,” for “common sense 
tells us that many citizens want to be law-abiding (and known as 
law-abiding), and that their desire to be law-abiding affects their 
behavior.”227 
Judge Kavanaugh’s concern that the ACA’s exaction for nonin-
surance may have the effect of a penalty seems unwarranted in 
theory and fact. As explained, theory suggests that materiality will 
outweigh expression for many people, who will pay the exaction in-
stead of buying insurance. To reiterate, the CBO’s analysis con-
cludes that (1) four million people each year will make the shared 
responsibility payment,228 and (2) the provision will produce $54 
billion in federal revenue over eight years.229 
The minimum coverage provision (§ 5000A(a)) and the shared 
responsibility payment (§ 5000A(b)) are best read together, as 
parts of a whole (§ 5000A). Congress placed them together in the 
same section of the ACA, and the only legal consequence of not 
behaving in accordance with § 5000A(a) is contained in 
§ 5000A(b). In other words, subsection (b) describes the exaction, 
224 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting as 
to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits). 
225 Id. at 48–49. 
226 Id. at 49. 
227 Id. 
228 Cong. Budget Office, Payments of Penalties, supra note 212. 
229 Cong. Budget Office, Updated Estimates, supra note 213. 
COOTER_SIEGEL_BOOK 9/11/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] Not the Power to Destroy 1247 
 
and subsection (a) describes the circumstances triggering it. The 
best reading of the statutory text and structure is that an applicable 
individual who goes without insurance is acting lawfully so long as 
she pays the exaction for noninsurance. This interpretation 
matches the Government’s position.230 Moreover, the Court has 
previously upheld tax laws framed in mandatory language,231 in ac-
cordance with the judicial obligation to construe federal laws so as 
to avoid constitutional problems.232 
In sum, the ACA’s exaction for noninsurance is mixed because it 
has a penalty’s expression and a tax’s materiality. An exaction that 
has the expressive characteristics of a penalty, the material charac-
teristics of a tax, and the predicted effect of a tax is most appropri-
ately classified as a tax. Because the predicted effect of the ACA’s 
exaction for noninsurance is to dampen uninsured behavior, not to 
prevent it, it is a tax equivalent for purposes of Congress’s tax 
power. One need not rely upon the deference logic discussed in 
Part III to arrive at this conclusion. But in light of the deference 
owed to Congress in enumerated powers cases, it would be particu-
larly inappropriate for courts to hold the minimum coverage provi-
sion and shared responsibility payment beyond the scope of the tax 
power. 
* * * 
On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided NFIB.233 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts upheld the ACA’s 
minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment as 
230 Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 48 n.38; see Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage 
Provision) at 61, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(No. 11-398) (“[N]either the Treasury Department nor the Department of Health and 
Human Services interprets Section 5000A as imposing a legal obligation on applicable 
individuals independent of its tax-penalty consequences; each instead views it as only 
a predicate provision for the imposition of tax consequences.”). 
231 See, e.g., The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471–72 (1867) (discussed 
supra note 142). 
232 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 
(2009). Citing Northwest Austin, Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “perhaps the canon of 
constitutional avoidance would allow” the interpretation that non-compliance with 
the minimum coverage provision is lawful, thereby “squeeze[ing] it within the Taxing 
Clause.” Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 48 n.38. 
233 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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permissible exercises of Congress’s tax power.234 Several commen-
tators quickly recognized that the logic, citations, and rhetoric of 
Roberts’ tax-power analysis closely resemble our theory.235 In con-
trast to commentators—especially Roberts’ critics—who proffer 
political explanations for his vote,236 our theory offers legal justifi-
cation for almost all of his analysis of the tax power and the conclu-
sion that he reached. Whether his opinion drew from our theory, 
our theory justifies his opinion for the Court. 
Labeling its inquiry a “functional approach,”237 the Court 
adopted two of our material characteristics—Roberts called them 
“practical characteristics”238—that distinguish a tax from a penalty 
for constitutional purposes: its level and whether there is a scienter 
requirement. In the Court’s view, a tax is an exaction at a moderate 
level that is collected by the IRS and does not have a scienter re-
quirement.239 
 The same analysis here suggests that the shared responsibility 
payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not 
a penalty: First, for most Americans the amount due will be far 
less than the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be 
234 See id at. 2593–600. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined this 
part of Roberts’ opinion for the Court. 
235 See supra note 11 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Randy Barnett, and Brian Leiter). 
236 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Roberts Decision Didn’t Open Floodgates for 
‘Compulsion Through Taxation,’ The Wash. Examiner, July 5, 2012, 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/roberts-decision-didnt-open-floodgates-for-
compulsion-through-taxation/article/2501386 (“[T]hese maneuvers made consti-
tutional law worse, even if they did save this law in hope of avoiding political 
attacks on the court.”). 
237 NIFB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. 
238 Id. at 2595, 2600. 
239 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court: 
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For example, in Drexel Furniture, 
we focused on three practical characteristics of the so-called tax on employing 
child laborers that convinced us the “tax” was actually a penalty. First, the tax 
imposed an exceedingly heavy burden—10 percent of a company’s net in-
come—on those who employed children, no matter how small their infraction. 
Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who knowingly employed un-
derage laborers. Such scienter requirements are typical of punitive statutes, be-
cause Congress often wishes to punish only those who intentionally break the 
law. Third, this “tax” was enforced in part by the Department of Labor, an 
agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws, not collecting reve-
nue. 
Id. at 2595. 
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more. It may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the 
payment rather than purchase insurance, unlike the “prohibi-
tory” financial punishment in Drexel Furniture. Second, the indi-
vidual mandate contains no scienter requirement. Third, the 
payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means 
of taxation . . . .240 
As we do, the Court stressed that a tax can tip into being a penalty 
when the burden becomes excessive and thus coercive, and that the 
minimum coverage provision is well below this tipping point.241 
And the Court connected the scienter requirement to the condem-
nation of an act as illegal, as we do.242 
Moreover, the Court agreed with us that differences in charac-
teristics cause different effects on behavior. One such difference, 
we agree, is that a tax raises revenues, whereas a penalty does not 
necessarily do so.243 We also agree on another difference in effect: a 
240 Id. at 2595–96 (internal citations omitted). 
241 See id. at 2599–600 (“We have nonetheless maintained that ‘there comes a time in 
the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character 
as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and pun-
ishment.’” (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 
(1994)); id. at 2600 (“We have already explained that the shared responsibility pay-
ment’s practical characteristics pass muster as a tax under our narrowest interpreta-
tions of the taxing power. Because the tax at hand is within even those strict limits, we 
need not here decide the precise point at which an exaction becomes so punitive that 
the taxing power does not authorize it. It remains true, however, that the ‘power to 
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Tex. Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364 (1949))); id. (“We do not make light 
of the severe burden that taxation—especially taxation motivated by a regulatory 
purpose—can impose. But imposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a 
lawful choice to do or not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied 
on that choice.”). 
242 See id. at 2595 (“Congress often wishes to punish only those who intentionally 
break the law.”). Morality and law connect scienter and wrongdoing by penalizing in-
tentional wrongdoing and not accidental harm; cf. id. at 2596–97 (“In distinguishing 
penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that ‘if the concept of penalty means 
anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission.’ While the individual 
mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it need not be read 
to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any other law attaches 
negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a pay-
ment to the IRS.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996))). 
243 See id. at 2596 (“This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at 
least some revenue for the Government. Indeed, the payment is expected to raise 
about $4 billion per year by 2017.” (citation omitted)). 
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tax dampens behavior without preventing it.244 Indeed, this Article 
explains that taxes raise revenues just because they dampen behav-
ior without preventing it. 
In addition, the Court concluded, as we do, that the characteris-
tics and effects of an exaction trump its label for constitutional 
purposes. Roberts made this point at several places in his opin-
ion.245 Finally, the Court, like us, focused on the anticipated effect 
of an exaction on individual behavior, not on whether Congress in-
tended to raise revenue or to regulate behavior: 
 None of this is to say that the payment is not intended to affect 
individual conduct. Although the payment will raise considerable 
revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance cover-
age. But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new. 
Some of our earliest federal taxes sought to deter the purchase of 
imported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth of 
domestic industry.246 
In sum, the Court applied two of the three characteristics that we 
use to distinguish taxes from penalties for constitutional purposes; 
it stressed, as we do, that differences in characteristics cause differ-
ent effects on individual behavior; and it concluded, as we do, that 
characteristics and effects trump labels and congressional intent.  
Like us, the Court disagreed with those who reject any judicially 
enforceable limits on the tax power. We doubt that Roberts would 
have upheld the minimum coverage provision as a tax if he be-
lieved that doing so implied no judicially enforceable limits on the 
244 See id. (“But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new.”); id. (“To-
day, federal and state taxes can compose more than half the retail price of cigarettes, 
not just to raise more money, but to encourage people to quit smoking.”); id. (“That 
§ 5000A seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not 
mean that it cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power.”). 
245 See id. at 2583 (“It is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a 
tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the oth-
er.”); id. at 2594 (“It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a ‘pen-
alty,’ not a ‘tax.’ But . . . that label . . . does not determine whether the payment may 
be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power.”); id. at 2595 (“We have simi-
larly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by Congress’s 
power to tax.”); id. at 2597 (“[L]abels should not control here.”). 
246 Id. at 2596 (citing Brownlee, supra note 21, at 22, and 2 Story, supra note 54, 
§ 962 (“the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes, than reve-
nue”)). Compare this with supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text, which discuss 
Hamilton’s program for industrialization and quote Brownlee and Story. 
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tax power, so that Congress could recast a penalty backing a regu-
lation of non-commercial conduct as a tax.   
In stressing the modest size of the exaction and the absence of a 
scienter requirement, the Court implied that there is an anti-
coercion limit on use of the tax power. The limit is crossed when 
Congress coerces people, which it may do by using the commerce 
power but not the tax power. The Court did “not here decide the 
precise point at which an exaction becomes so punitive that the 
taxing power does not authorize it,” even as it agreed with Holmes 
that the “power to tax is not the power to destroy.”247 According to 
our theory, to “destroy” is to prevent the conduct. Thus an exac-
tion changes from a tax to a penalty at the point where it prevents 
the conduct instead of dampening it.248  
Besides these similarities, the Court’s analysis of the tax power 
differed from ours in several ways. First, the Court did not mention 
enhancements for recidivism, such as increasing payments for con-
tinuing to engage in the assessed conduct. Even so, Roberts—and 
thus the Court—likely would have responded to such enhance-
ments if they were present in the law.249 Second, the Court thought 
it pertinent that the payment will be collected by the IRS, “the 
agency that collects taxes,”250 as opposed to an agency charged with 
punishing violations of the law.251 We think whether a payment is a 
tax or a penalty is distinct from the question of who enforces it.252 
Third, Roberts invoked a saving construction in a part of his opin-
ion for himself alone.253 This seems inappropriate to us (and to the 
247 Id. at 2600; accord id. (quoted supra note 241); see supra note 177 and accompa-
nying text.  
248 See supra note 176. We have thus identified the tipping point in principle, but we 
do not suggest that a vague principle yields precise answers in hard cases. 
 249 If the amount that one had to pay for going without insurance went up signifi-
cantly each month, Roberts probably would have concluded that the exaction was co-
ercive and a penalty. 
250 Id. at 2596 n.9. 
251 See id. at 2595, 2596 & n.9. 
252 See supra note 165 (distinguishing how an exaction works from who assesses and 
collects it). 
253  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94, 2600–01. He wrote: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG questions the necessity of rejecting the Government’s 
commerce power argument, given that §5000A can be upheld under the taxing 
power. But the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance 
than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. 
It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command 
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other members of the majority) in light of the modern canon of 
constitutional avoidance.254 In spite of small differences, the Court’s 
analysis and our analysis are so similar that our theory can justify 
almost all of the Court’s reasoning on the tax power, as well as the 
decisive vote that Roberts cast.255 
CONCLUSION 
If the Commerce Clause has limits, then “Taxes,” which Con-
gress may impose under the Taxing Clause, must differ from regu-
lations backed by penalties, which Congress may not impose under 
this clause. In this Article, we have identified material differences 
between taxes and penalties by interpreting constitutional text, 
structure, history, and precedent with help from economics. Taxes 
raise revenues and change behavior without preventing it. Pure 
taxes also express permission to engage in the taxed conduct as 
long as one pays the tax. By contrast, penalties prevent conduct by 
that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because 
we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that §5000A can 
be interpreted as a tax. 
Id. at 2600–01(citation omitted). Roberts also wrote that “[t]he Government asks us 
to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitu-
tion.” Id. at 2594. That is inaccurate. The Government argued that the tax power pro-
vides an independently sufficient basis for upholding the minimum coverage provi-
sion. Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 52, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398,) (“The minimum cover-
age provision is independently authorized by Congress’s tax power.”). 
 254 The modern canon of constitutional avoidance does not license, let alone require, 
a judge to first conclude that the minimum coverage provision is beyond the scope of 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses before concluding that the provi-
sion may reasonably be characterized as a tax. For a discussion, see generally Neil S. 
Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and Statesman-
ship, in The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications 
(Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison & Nathaniel Persily eds., forthcoming 2013).  
255 The joint dissent co-authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
concluded that the tax power did not support the minimum coverage provision. The 
dissent mostly echoed the arguments of jurists and commentators who earlier re-
jected, or expressed concerns about, the tax power as justification for the minimum 
coverage provision, including Judge Sutton, Judge Kavanaugh, and Professor Randy 
Barnett. See, e.g., id. at 2652 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(“So the question is, quite simply, whether the exaction here is imposed for violation 
of the law. It unquestionably is.”); id. at 2653 (“[W]e have never—never—treated as a 
tax an exaction which faces up to the critical difference between a tax and a penalty, 
and explicitly denominates the exaction a ‘penalty.’”). We already responded to many 
of those arguments earlier in this Part. 
COOTER_SIEGEL_BOOK 9/11/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] Not the Power to Destroy 1253 
 
imposing a high exaction relative to the gain of almost all actors, 
and by increasing the exaction for intentional or repeated wrong-
doing. Pure penalties also express a prohibition against the penal-
ized conduct.   
The exaction for noninsurance in the Affordable Care Act has 
the expressive characteristics of a penalty, the material characteris-
tics of a tax, and almost certainly will have the effect of a tax. Al-
though not a pure tax, the effects of this exaction are equivalent to 
a tax. In these circumstances, the exaction’s name should make no 
difference to its constitutionality under the Taxing Clause, as the 
Court properly concluded in NFIB.256 
256 We have shown that (1) the General Welfare Clause authorizes Congress to tax; 
(2) some taxes are materially equivalent to regulations that dampen conduct without 
penalizing it; and (3) the material characteristics of an exaction generally affect con-
duct more than its expressive form when the two conflict. Because the General Wel-
fare Clause permits federal taxation, it should also be interpreted as authorizing Con-
gress to impose materially equivalent regulations, which we call “tax equivalents.” 
Thus in Collective Action Federalism, we suggested the possibility that the initial 
clause of Article I, § 8 confers at least some regulatory authority. See Cooter & 
Siegel, supra note 16, at 170–75. 
*** 
